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Louisiana’s legal heritage has long been a source of 
fascination, curiosity, and, sadly, misinformation. 
Outsiders have viewed the legal system as an anomaly, 
an odd appendage at the mouth of the Mississippi, and 
they have shunned its study because of its perceived 
quirkiness.1
          
                                                 
1 Mark F. Fernandez, Introduction: Louisiana Legal History: Past, Present, and Future, A LAW UNTO 
ITSELF? 1 (2001).  
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Abstract 
 
 This presentation provides a complete guide that helps the readers understand the 
importance of art.1928 of the Civil Code of Louisiana of the year 1825. Article 1928, in 
its third paragraph, is the cornerstone for the recovery of non-pecuniary damages in the 
state of Louisiana.  
 As to achieve the objective of guiding the reader, the presentation contains: a 
historical background of the legal system of Louisiana (from the purchase to France until 
present days); a definition of non-pecuniary damages; an analysis of the applications the 
Louisiana Supreme Court made of non-pecuniary damages (between the years 1825 to 
1870); and a description of the influence that art.1928 had in other codification projects, 
both in Louisiana and abroad. 
 Throughout the presentation, references are done to the French and Spanish 
influences on the region. To ignore these important influences would avoid a realistic 
approach to the study. In addition, a brief description of the case law reporting in 
Antebellum Louisiana is developed. The description will surely help future research 
activities, by explaining the sources of case law reporting in the region.   
At the end of the presentation, a list of references, a table of cases and an index of 
names and personalities, are enclosed. These are useful quick-reference tools when 
reading through the presentation. 
 xi
Landmarks to Understand the History of the Louisiana Civil System2
 
 
1699  Pierre le Moyne, Sieur d’ Iberville explores the Mississippi and establishes a royal 
colony at Ocean Springs, Mississippi. 
1712  By royal charter, France grants Crozat a monopoly on La. commerce. 
1717  Crozat surrenders his charter. 
1718  Jean Baptiste le Moyne, Sieur de Bienville establishes New Orleans. 
1762  France secretly cedes La. to Spain. 
1768  Local French inhabitants revolt against Spanish rule. 
1769  Don Alejandro O’Reilly takes possession of La. for Spain. 
1800  Spain cedes La. to France by the Treaty of San Ildefonso. 
1803  November 30, Spain formally transfers La. to France. 
December 20, Laussat, a French prefect, transfers La. to the United States. 
1808  La. Legislature enacts Digest of the Civil Law Now in Force in the Territory of 
Orleans (French Original and English Translation). 
1823  La. Legislature passes project of Civil Code. 
1825  La. Civil Code (French and English). 
1870  Promulgation of the Revised Civil Code of the State of Louisiana (English). 
1948  The La. State Law Institute was instructed to revise the Civil Code.  
                                                 
2 S. HERMAN, THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: A EUROPEAN LEGACY FOR THE UNITED STATES 57 (1993); and 
Alain Levasseur & Roger Ward, 300 Years and Counting: The French influence on the Louisiana Legal 
System, 46 LA Bar Jnl. 300 (1998) 300, 306 (1998).  
 xii
Intention 
 
 
The Master in Laws program at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center of the Louisiana 
State University requires the submission of a thesis. This work intends to fulfill such 
requirement. 
As to avoid false expectations and deception in the reader, it is mandatory to 
express in a clear way and ad initio the main points that this work covers.  
Initially, it is worth mentioning that this presentation studies the institution of 
non-pecuniary damages as it was applied in the geographical region of La. as from the 
early Nineteenth Century.  
The following pages show that non-pecuniary damages were first included in the 
wording of art. 1928 of the La. Civil Code, back in the year 1825. Such inclusion 
presented originality at that time, and also a starting point for other subsequent 
codification adventures.  
In order to locate the reader historically and geographically, this presentation 
provides a historical background, summarizing the main events as from the La. purchase 
to France. Further, it analyzes non-pecuniary damages and the wording of the pertinent 
articles inside the La. Civil Codes (starting by the 1825 Code). The work continues by 
studding the La. Court decisions related to that area of law. Finally, it mentions part of 
the influence art. 1928 had on the work codifiers undertook in La. and other regions of 
the planet. 
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In brief, the presentation transports the reader back to the early Nineteenth 
Century and traces the origins of non-pecuniary damages in La. Also, it helps understand 
how courts applied the principles of that institution, and finally mentions its influence.   
The author has worked with primary and secondary sources during the elaboration 
of this presentation. 
The historical background and the influence on other codification projects have 
been developed with the grounding that important secondary sources provide, together 
with some historical materials that could be found in the Rare Book Room of the LSU 
Law Library. On the contrary, the applications of art.1928 have been studied by working 
with primary sources (i.e. Court reporters). This is perhaps the main contribution to the 
area of study.    
These initial words would be incomplete without mentioning that, after being for 
some time in La., the author shares the opinion that the civilian aspects of La. provide not 
only a fascinating and rich legal history, but they also provide educators and students the 
possibility to become adept in both common law and civil traditions. 3  
The author also shares the opinion that, substantively and pedagogically, La. has 
the best of both worlds for those who wish to take advantage of it. On the one hand, the 
civil courses prompt deep analysis of legislation that is designed to cover a subject 
coherently, systematically, and completely. On the other hand, common law subjects 
provide opportunity for classic Socratic style case analysis and synthesis. In La. it is 
                                                 
3 Christopher L. Blakesley, The Impact of a Mixed Jurisdiction on Legal Education, Scholarship and Law, 
LOUISIANA MICROCOSM OF A MIXED JURISDICTION 61, 66 (1999). 
 2
possible to receive the double benefit.4 La. is a melting pot that provides a broader 
formation for contemporary scholars and law professionals.  
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Id. supra note 3, at 66. 
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First Part  
Historical Background 
 4
Chapter I  
The Way to a Civil Law System  
 
 
This historical background helps introduce the reader to a situation for better 
understanding the developments mentioned in the entire presentation. It also provides an 
interesting background as to understand the origins of the establishment of the civil law 
system in La.5  
 
1. The Louisiana Purchase, and Before  
 
Although not central for this presentation, it is enriching to notice that, even 
before the Spanish and French, Native Americans were the earliest inhabitants of La. 
When studied, Native Americans in the region have been divided into six general families 
or language groups who lived in a definitive area, and each spoke its own language.6 
Each general family also was divided into smaller groups or tribes.7 The land occupied 
by the six groups had no specific limits, though it was understood that one group should 
not settle, hunt nor fish in the area of another group. With regards to limits, and showing 
a significant difference to other primitive human settlements, it is important to notice that 
                                                 
5 A reference to the Landmarks to Understand the History of the Louisiana Civil System (vide supra pg. xii) 
is of great help. 
6 According to EDWIN ADAMS DAVIS, LOUISIANA THE PELICAN STATE 4-7 (1978) the families were: 
Atakapan, Muskhogean, Chitimachan, Caddoan, Natchezan and Tunican. 
7 EDWIN ADAMS DAVIS, LOUISIANA THE PELICAN STATE 4 (1978).  
 5
La. rivers did not necessarily work as geographical boundaries for tribes or groups.8 With 
respect to the relation between the groups or families, it has been said that in general the 
La. tribes were peaceful9 in their relations. 
As from the early years of the Spanish discovery until the mid Sixteenth Century, 
Spanish colonizers explored the region of La. without establishing permanent settlements. 
The actual region of La. remained virtually untouched by Europeans for almost 140 
years,10 till French explorers entered the region in the late Seventeenth Century.  
For the purposes of this presentation it is central to trace back to the Seventeenth 
Century. At that time, France expanded its presence in America by pushing into the 
unexplored western frontiers of the big new continent. Being established in Quebec, the 
French pioneers moved into the region of the Great Lakes and along North America's 
great rivers (e.g. Missouri, Mississippi), which served as natural highways for explorers 
and fur traders. That intention to expand the frontiers drove the French to the lower 
Mississippi River country during the last years of the Seventeenth Century. 11  
Pushed by the need to explore and claim greater portions of the continent in the 
name of France, Rene Robert Cavelier Sieur de La Salle, sailed down 1,000 miles the 
Mississippi River to its mouth.12 There, on April 9, 1682, La Salle claimed the Lower 
Mississippi River region for the King of France, Louis XIV, and named the region 
                                                 
8 Id. supra note 7, at 7.  
9 Id. supra note 7, at 7. 
10 EDWIN ADAMS DAVIS, LOUISIANA THE PELICAN STATE 18 (1975) cited by Roger K. Ward, The French 
Language in Louisiana Law and Legal Education: A Requiem, 57 La. L. Rev. 1283, 1288 (1997). 
11Id. supra note 10, at 1288.  
12Id. supra note 10, at 1288. 
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Louisiane in his honor.13  The French law and regulations came to La. together with La 
Salle.  
In 1712, the French Crown officially decreed that the Custom of Paris would 
govern the colony and placed the colony effectively in the hands of both business 
speculators and a Superior Council. Later in 1731, the French Crown took over 
management of the colony again.14  
In 1762, during the reign of Louis XV and due to the Treaty of Fontainebleau,15 
France gave the territory to Spain. In 1765, Don Antonio de Ulloa arrived in New 
Orleans, being the first Spanish governor. Due to his unpopularity he was removed by an 
armed movement, and in 1769, Alejandro O’Reilly was named new governor.16 O’Reilly 
installed the Spanish governmental system, replacing the French Superior Council with 
the Spanish Cabildo.17  
Another very important disposition of O’Reilly was to supersede the French laws 
(e.g. Custom of Paris and Ordinances of the French kings) and implement the Spanish 
colonial laws.18 He proclaimed the French law would be abolished and the Spanish law19 
                                                 
13  Id. supra note 10, at 1288. 
14 David Gruning, Bayou State Bijuralism: Common Law and Civil Law in Louisiana, 81 U. Det. Mercy L. 
Rev. 437, 442 (2004). 
15 Saul Litvinoff, Codificación en Louisiana, 2 LA CODIFICACIÓN: RAÍCES Y PROSPECTIVAS 127, 127 
(2004).  
16 Ricardo Lifsic, Historia del Código Civil de Louisiana. Antecedente del Código Civil Argentino, 12 
REVISTA DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO, 164, 164 (1961).  
17 Id. supra note 14, at 442. 
18 Id. supra note 16, at 164.  
19 Amongst the laws that were enforced in La. it is possible to mention: Fuero Juzgo, Fuero Viejo, Las Siete 
Partidas, la Recopilación de Leyes de Indias, la Recopilación de Castilla, las Leyes de Toro, el 
Ordenamiento de Alcalá de Henares, las Leyes de Estilo. 
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would be thereafter the law of the province.20 By 1785, the province had 32,062 
inhabitants (14,215 free whites; 1,303 free people of color; and 16,544 slaves).21  
In 1800, the French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte secured the return of La. to 
France through the secret22 Treaty of San Ildefonso.23 That return was part of a larger 
plan to support French interests of crop plantations in the island of San Domingue 
(present Haiti).24 He believed La. would be useful as to provide food and supplies to the 
island, and to start a French empire in America.25  
In 1803, Thomas Jefferson sent Robert Livingston and James Monroe as 
plenipotentiaries to Paris to negotiate a potential purchase of La. from France.26 Due to 
the fact that the intentions of the French in the Caribbean had failed, and being pressured 
by the increasing cost of military campaigns in Europe, Napoleon Bonaparte sold La. to 
the United States.  
By the end of that same year, the French flag in La. was replaced definitively by 
the United States flag. 27 Napoleon Bonaparte had accepted the United States proposal to 
purchase the territory for a total value of 15 million dollars,28 or 60 millions francs in 
                                                 
20 Alain Levasseur, La Réception du Système de la Common Law par le Système Législatif Français en 
Louisiane, LA RECEPTION DES SYSTEMS JURIDIQUES: IMPLANTATIONS ET DESTINS 382, 382 (1992).  
21 JEFFERSON, AN ACCOUNT OF LOUISIANA BEING AN ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENTS IN THE OFFICES OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND OF THE TREASURY 17 (1803). 
22 The formal transfer was made on November 30, 1803. 
23 Id. supra note 15, at 128. 
24 Id. supra note 14, at 442. 
25 Id. supra note 7, at 116.  
26 Id. supra note 7, at 119. 
27 Id. supra note 14, at 442. 
28 Id. supra note 16, at 166.  
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French currency.29  The cession of La. to the United States was made in December 20, 
1803, under the presidency of Thomas Jefferson.30  
The United States took control of the territory, and Claiborne took possession of 
La. as commissioner. On 1804, the new territory was divided by the American Congress 
into the Territory of Orleans and the District of Louisiana.31 Finally, in 1812, La. was 
admitted as a State into the Union and formed its first constitution.32
 
2. Legal Dispositions Applied in the Region   
 
The laws and regulations applied in the region of La. have evolved several times 
during the last centuries. Those changes are due especially to the constant alterations La. 
has been subject to with respect to its possession (i.e. Spanish, French, Spanish, French, 
and United States).  
Since the Spanish discovery and until 1712, it is understood that Spanish 
regulations where applied to the settlements were Spanish people lived or would practice 
commerce.33  
As it has been mentioned supra, La. was colonized by the French in 1699, but, 
from the legal point of view, it was in 1712 that the French Ordinances and the Custom of 
                                                 
29 CHARLES E. FENNER, THE GENESIS AND DESCENT OF THE SYSTEM OF CIVIL LAW PREVAILING IN 
LOUISIANA 18 (1886). 
30 Id. supra note 15, at 128. 
31 Id. supra note 16, at 166.  
32 Id. supra note 29, at 19. 
33 It has been mentioned supra that the actual region of La. remained virtually untouched by Europeans for 
almost 140 years. Hence, the Spanish provisions would have applied if any settlement or act of commerce 
had existed.  
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Paris started to be applied. Hence, the French laws were applied from that year until 
1769.34
In 1769 O’Reilly superseded the French law. Therefore, the Spanish laws and 
provisions turned to be the sole law in the region of La.35 The end of the application of 
Spanish law in La. is difficult to establish. In that respect it has been said that the return 
of La. under the dominion of France, and its transfer to the United States, did not for a 
moment, weaken the Spanish laws in the province.36   
Also, it has been said that the Spanish laws and provisions were the law in La. 
from 1769 until 1808, notwithstanding that La. was returned to France in 1800 and then 
transferred to the United States in 1803.37
It was with the Digest that La. first had a legal regime of its own. As from that 
landmark, La. has provided its own body of laws at the state level and has adopted the 
federal dispositions that the Union has demanded. 
The Digest had no provision effecting a blanket repeal of the past Spanish 
jurisprudence. The Digest's enacting legislation repealed only the ancient civil laws that 
were inconsistent. 38  
In the famous case Cottin v. Cottin39 of 1817, Justice Derbigny explained the 
principle of implied repeal as: “It must not be lost sight of, that our civil code is a digest 
                                                 
34 Id. supra note 16, at 164.  
35 Vide supra note 18. 
36 L. MOREAU-LISLET AND HENRY CARLETON, THE LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, WHICH ARE STILL IN 
FORCE IN THE STATE OF LOUISIANA. TRANSLATED FROM THE SPANISH XXI (1820).  
37 Id. supra note 16, at 165.  
38 Vernon Palmer, The Death of a Code--The Birth of a Digest, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 221, 244 (1988). 
39 Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Mart.(o.s.) 93. The issue, as briefed by Vernon Palmer, was whether the Digest’s 
definition of an “abortive” child as a child “incapable” of living repealed by implication a Spanish 
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of the civil laws, which were in force in this country, when it was adopted; that those 
laws must be considered as untouched, wherever the alterations and amendments, 
introduced in the digest, do not reach them; and that such parts of those laws only are 
repealed, as are either contrary to, or incompatible with the provisions of the code.”40
As a consequence of Cottin, all Spanish law that was compatible would play the 
role of supplementing the Digest. The old Spanish law was regarded as “Louisiana's 
common law” because it remained the background that the Digest partially displaced, but 
did not expressly repeal.41
The principle of implied repeal stated by the court was not new. It could be traced 
back in the Roman Justinian's digest and could be found also in Toullier. The 
jurisprudence that followed Cottin noted that new laws must be contrary to old laws in 
order to repeal them and that an exception to a general rule was not repealed by enacting 
the general rule without the exception.42
The 1825 Code seemed to end the dispute by introducing art. 352143 amongst its 
provisions. Notwithstanding, the La. Supreme Court in 1827 held that the Spanish laws 
                                                                                                                                                 
provision that defined an abortive child as one who did not live at least twenty-four hours. Seeing no 
necessary conflict between the two ways of defining an abortive child, the court held that the twenty-four-
hour test of Spanish law had not been repealed and that it would be applied. 
40 Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Mart.(o.s.) 93.  
41 Id. supra note 38, at 244. 
42 Id. supra note 38, at 245. 
43 1825 Code read: “From and after the promulgation of this Code, the Spanish, Roman and French laws, 
which were in force in this state, when Louisiana was ceded to the United States, and the acts of the 
Legislative Council, of the legislature of the Territory of Orleans, and of the Legislature of the Ste of 
Louisiana, be and are hereby repealed in every case, for which it has been especially provided in this Code, 
and that they shall not be invoked as laws, even under the pretence that their provisions are not contrary or 
repugnant to those of this Code” According to CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA BY AUTHORITY 
PRINTED BY J. C. DE ST. ROMES [FROM THE PARISH COURT OF PLAQUEMINES (MANUSCRIPT)] 1112 (1825).  
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which were not contrary to the 1825 Code were still in force and that the articles of the 
Digest, which had been omitted from the 1825 Code, also were in effect.44 That 
resolution of the La. Supreme Court led the La. Legislature to adopt two acts45 that 
intended to repeal the ancient laws.  
Even these acts did not have the effect of eliminating further references to 
Spanish laws. The La. Supreme Court shortly thereafter held that the acts only repealed 
positive, written, or statute laws of Spain, and that they did not abrogate those principles 
of law which had been established or settled by the decisions of the courts. This open 
ending seems to have kept the Spanish law in effect till present days in La. 46  
                                                 
44 John T. Hood Jr., The history and development of the Louisiana Civil Code, 33 Tul. L. Rev. 7, 18 (1958). 
45 La. Acts of 1828, N 40: An act to repeal certain articles of the Former Civil code…Whereas, doubts have 
arisen whether the provisions contained in the former civil code, approved on the 31 of March, 1808, 
which are not reprinted in the new Civil Code of Louisiana, are repealed….Therefore, be it enacted by the 
Senate and House of Representatives of the sate of Louisiana in General Assembly convened, that all the 
articles contained in the old civil code of this state, approved on the 31 of March, 1808, and all the 
provisions of the same which are not reprinted in the new civil code of Louisiana, published under 
authority of state on the 12 April, 1824, the articles are enumerated from 1 to 3,522 be, and the same are, 
hereby, repealed; except so much of much of title tenth as is embraced in its third chapter, which treats, “of 
the dissolution of communities or corporations La. Acts 1828, 8th Legis. 2nd Sess., No. 40, p. 66 
La. Acts of 1828, N 83: An act further amending several articles of the Civil Code and Code of Practice: 
Section 1. Be enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Louisiana, in General 
Assembly convened… Section 25. And be it further enacted, that all the rules of proceeding which existed in 
this state before the promulgation of the code of practice, except those relative to juries, recusation of 
judges and other officers and of witnesses, and with respect to the competency of the latter, be and are 
hereby abrogated and that all the civil laws which were in force before the promulgation of the civil code 
lately promulgated, be and are hereby abrogated, except so much of title tenth of the old civil code as is 
embraced in its third chapter, which treats of the dissolution of communities or corporations. La. Acts 
1828, 8th Legis. 2nd Sess., No. 83, p. 150. 
46 Id. supra note 44, at 18. 
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After having described the previous scenarios, it is enriching to note the mutation 
the La. legal system suffered during the first half of the Nineteenth Century, when 
changing from its French and Spanish ancestors to a body of law of itself:  
1. In the period 1809-1828 the Superior Court of the Territory of Orleans and the 
Supreme Court of La. cited: i) Spanish codes, customs or ordinances four times more 
frequently than French codes, customs or ordinances; ii) French treatises and 
commentaries only slightly more frequently than Spanish treatises and commentaries; iii) 
Spanish statutes twelve times more frequently than French statutes; and iv) hardly ever 
Spanish or French judicial decisions. 47  
2. By far the most frequently cited Spanish authorities were the Partidas (247 
citations), Febréro (207), and the Curia Philipica (162). These three authorities 
accounted for 60% of all citations to Spanish authorities. 48  
3. The translation of the Partidas into English in 1820 resulted in a 100% increase 
in the frequency with which it was cited by the La. courts. 49  
4. Citations of Spanish authority declined significantly after the adoption of the 
1825 Code and Code of Practice of 1825.50
                                                 
47 Raphael J. Rabalais, The Influence of Spanish Laws and Treatises on the Jurisprudence of Louisiana: 
1762-1828, 42 La. L. Rev. 1485, 1504 (1982). 
48 Id. supra note 47, at 1504.  
49 Id. supra note 47, at 1505. 
50 Id. supra note 47, at 1505. 
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Chapter II 
Adopting a Code for the Region 
 
 
A description of the first legislative attempts the region of La. undertook to reach 
a Civil Code is provided in this Chapter. In addition, the projects that preceded the 
fulfillment of such an objective are mentioned. Finally, the 1825 Code is studied 
considering all the preceding bodies of law enacted in the region.  
 
1. The Digest of the Civil Laws (1808) 
 
A distinguished Latin American legal historian said that the tremor of falling in a 
Common Law regime moved the La. Legislature to codify.51 That pressure to provide a 
prompt Civil Code moved Brown and Moreau-Lislet to find main grounding in the best 
available model at that time (i.e. the French Code). If they would have had to stick to the 
vernacular law (i.e. the Spanish law) they would have taken much more time to fulfill 
their work; an inadmissible situation regarding the dangerous circumstances the juridical 
culture of La. faced.52 That culture was an isolated Civil Law island surrounded by a sea 
of Common Law, a status that if not safeguarded would not survive. Therefore, on March 
                                                 
51 Alejandro Guzmán Brito, La Influencia del Código Civil francés en las Codificaciones Americanas, 9 
CUADERNOS DE EXTENSIÓN JURÍDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD  DE LOS ANDES 17, 29 (2004).  
52 Id. supra note 51, at 29. 
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31, 1808, the La. Legislature adopted the Digest of the Civil Laws Now in Force in the 
Territory of Orleans by formal enactment.53  
The Digest was modeled from the project of the French Code, and followed the 
systematic distribution of its source of inspiration, consisting of: Alphabetical Index of 
Subjects; Preliminary Title; Book I of Persons; Book II of Things or Estates; and Book 
III of the Different manners of Acquiring the Property of Things.” 54  
The Digest was originally written in French and translated to English.55 When 
adopted, the La. Legislature provided that in cases where the text was ambiguous or 
obscure both the English and French texts should be consulted and should mutually serve 
to the interpretation. However, further court decisions established that French being the 
working language of the codifiers, therefore, the French version was to be authoritative. 
56
The sources the codifiers used when drafting the Digest raised intense scholarly 
debate. On one hand, Professor Batiza undertook an exhaustive analysis of the provisions 
of the Digest, and after comparing them with other legal texts available to the drafters, 
assured that the drafters had been eclectic in their source selection. He concluded that 
about 85% of the Digest derived from French sources (70% originated in a draft of the 
French Code), and the remaining 15% from Spanish, Roman, and English sources. 57  
                                                 
53 GEORGE DARGO, JEFFERSON’S LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL TRADITIONS 156 (1975). 
 54 Id. supra note 53, at 156. 
55 John M. Shuey, Civil Codes -Control of the French Text of the Code of 1825, 3 La. L. Rev. 352, 453 
(1941). 
56 Id. supra note 53, at 156. 
57 S. HERMAN, THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: A EUROPEAN LEGACY FOR THE UNITED STATES 31 (1993).  
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On the other hand, Professor Pascal assured that the work of the codifiers was 
even more eclectic and imaginative than what Professor Batiza had suggested.58 
Professor Pascal sustained the codifiers used the French Code and its drafts for the 
structure of the Digest, and even copied provisions of these when they expressed 
principles and rules of Spanish and Roman laws then in force in La. Notwithstanding, he 
mentioned that if French provisions were incompatible with Spanish and Roman law, the 
codifiers translated or rephrased the Spanish and Roman texts as to reflect and 
incorporate them into the Digest.59
All the scientific community was enriched with the debate of these great scholars 
because it: (i) brought light to an obscure area of legal history; (ii) reflected that the 
sources and institutions of the Digest, whether French, Spanish, or Roman, were 
essentially civilian; (iii) determined the Digest was not a mere copy of the French Code 
or any other single text; and (iv) demonstrated that the La. inhabitants were able to 
achieve their goal of tailoring a Civil Code for La.60 In brief it may be said that, despite 
the origin of its provisions in Spanish, French, or other sources, the Digest was La. law. 61   
As it has been reflected in the previous paragraphs, the Digest is one of the most 
interesting and significant developments in the history of codification in the Western 
                                                 
58 Although it is not the intention to extend in the debate, it is worth mention that Professor Pascal 
concluded that Professor Batiza’s work had not been in vain. He said that on the contrary, it was a start in 
the direction of ascertaining both the literal and the substantive sources of the Digest articles. Professor 
Pascal also said that Professor Batiza’s work emerged finally as a work of concordances rather than an 
index of sources. See Robert A. Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: a Reply to Professor Batiza, 46 Tul. 
L. Rev. 603, 623-624 (1972).  
59 Id. supra note 57, at 31.  
60 Id. supra note 57, at 32. 
61 A. N. Yiannopoulos, The Early sources of Louisiana Law: Critical appraisal of a controversy, 
LOUISIANA’S LEGAL HERITAGE 87, 100 (1983). 
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Hemisphere.62 It is one of the earliest examples of a code attempt drafted from a variety 
of European sources, and there is little doubt that the enactment of a digest rather than a 
code was the intention of the La. Legislature.63 It was aimed to be a guide64 and 
established a civilian system of private law for La.65 Being a digest it was a summary or 
compilation of preexisting law designed to make the ancient ruling law known and 
available. Notwithstanding some formal resemblances to modern civil codes, the Digest 
lacked the essential element of a genuine work of code law.66
The Digest was short lived, and it was abrogated and replaced by the 1825 
Code.67 Agitation encouraged legislative commissions with authority as to recommend 
alterations, additions and changes to the original text of the Digest. The report of these 
commissions resulted in the creation of two new separate codes (i.e. 1825 Code and Code 
of Practice). Those new codes should supplant all previous foreign law, civil or common; 
and create the civil practice and civil law of La.68   
                                                 
62 Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: its actual sources and present relevance, XIII THE 
LOUISIANA PURCHASE BICENTENNIAL SERIES IN LOUISIANA HISTORY: AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE LAW 
AND JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS IN LOUISIANA 1803-2003 54, 54 (2004). 
63 Id. supra note 53, at 157.  
64 Id. supra note 53, at 157. 
65 Id. supra note 62, at 54. 
66 Id. supra note 53, at 157.  
67 Id. supra note 61, at 101. 
68 Henry P. Dart, The Place of the Civil Law in Louisiana, XIII THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE BICENTENNIAL 
SERIES IN LOUISIANA HISTORY: AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE LAW AND JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS IN 
LOUISIANA 1803-2003 166, 170 (2004). 
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To close this section, it may be said that the significance of the Digest is not 
merely historical. Through the intermediate agency of the 1825 Code and the 1870 Code, 
many of its provisions survived69 into the Twentieth Century and its recent revisions. 
 
2. Project for a Necessary Code (1823) 
 
The initial need of an immediate body to regulate the civil law in La. had been 
momentarily fulfilled with the enactment of the Digest. Shortly after 1808, the La. 
judicial community started to feel the need for a new and more finished Code of civil 
law.70  
The Digest showed it could not satisfy the growing judicial needs, and prominent 
attorneys continued working on the arrangement of legal dispositions and studying 
sources as for a better development of the practice in La. 
Amongst those attorneys it is possible to mention Moreau-Lislet and Carleton. 
They made a great contribution71 by translating into English the monumental Partidas. 
The translation consisted of a list of the titles of the Roman laws, Spanish laws and the 
Digest (relative to the subject treated) preceded by each title of the Partidas. In addition, 
it included an index of the contained articles.72  
There was also a serious concern in the judicial community about the 
comprehensiveness and proper interpretation that should be made of the Digest’s 
                                                 
69 Id. supra note 62, at 54. 
70 GEORGE DARGO, LEGAL CODIFICATION AND THE POLITICS OF TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT IN 
JEFFERSON’S LOUISIANA, 1803-1808 358 (1970). 
71 See page 14 and note 49.   
72 Id. supra note 36, at xxiii. 
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provisions. Early judicial interpretations reflected uncertainty about the continuing 
significance of Spanish, French, and Roman laws then in force.73
At that same time, a remarkable and comprehensive codification movement was 
started having Edward Livingston as its central figure. His objective included not only a 
Civil Code and a Code of Practice but also a Commercial Code and a Criminal Code.74 
With respect to the first of those codification works, he advocated for a consolidation, not 
only to consider the necessary adjustments and improvements which past experiences 
indicated, but also to finish with all the uncertainties the ancient civil laws faced. 75   
Continuing with the search for satisfaction, on March 1822, the La. Legislature 
appointed Moreau-Lislet, Derbigny, and Livingston himself, to draft a revision of the 
Digest.76 Their work was fulfilled when they printed the Project with their proposed 
revisions, both in French and English.  
On March 1823, the La. Legislature ordered that the Project should be printed and 
distributed as soon as completed.77 The French text was printed in one volume, a small 
folio of 425 (3) pages; and the English translation was printed about the same time, 
separately, in a small folio of 219, 176 (3) pages.78
                                                 
73 S. HERMAN ET ALIA, THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: A HUMANISTIC APPRAISAL 25-26 (1981). 
74 Joseph Dainow, Introductory Commentary to the Louisiana Civil Code, 1CIVIL CODE -WEST’S 
LOUISIANA STATUTES ANNOTATED- 10,10  (1952). 
75 Id. supra note 74, at 10. 
76 KATE WALLACH, RESEARCH IN LOUISIANA LAW 47 (1960). 
77Id. supra note 76, at 47. 
78John H. Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law, 6 Tul L. Rev. 280, 287 (1931-1932). 
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As the title of the Project indicated79 only the additions and amendments which 
they recommended were included, and they omitted the articles of the Digest which they 
did not propose to amend.80 Therefore, for a complete text of the projected revisions, the 
Project had to be used in conjunction with the Digest.81 The Project indicated all the 
changes, additions and omissions proposed, and, often indicated the reason for the 
proposed amendment.82 In addition, the Project frequently cited the authorities upon 
which the amendments were based.83  
In the preliminary report, of February 1823, addressed to the President of the 
Senate, the drafters advanced their intention to respect the principles which had received 
the sanction of time. Amongst those principles they mentioned were: the Partidas; other 
Spain statutes; the Digest; the abundant English Jurisprudence; and the comprehensive 
French Code.84  Hence, as in the Digest experience they absorbed sections of the French 
Code that their experience and wisdom found applicable to La. and did not ignore the 
                                                 
79 Complete title of the Project: “Additions and Amendments to the Civil Code of the State of Louisiana, 
Proposed in Obedience to the Resolution of the Legislature of the 14th, March, 1822, by the Jurist 
Commissioned for that Purpose.” 
80 Id. supra note 44, at 17. 
81 Id. supra note 76, at 48-49. 
82 Perhaps the most important source book for Research in La. mentions that the text of each proposed 
article is preceded by a note explaining where the article will be placed in relation to the article of the 
Civil Code of 1808. The text is printed in large type. Observations of the redactors are printed in small type 
below many of the articles. These notations frequently cite the source of the proposed change, and are 
valuable aids for correct interpretation. Original copies of the Project are very scarce; it has, however, 
been reprinted as volume one of the ‘Louisiana Legal Archives’. Id. supra note  48. 
83 Id. supra note 78, at 287. 
84 Id. supra note 76, at 47. 
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Spanish law that supported principles and practice. In brief, they did not follow French or 
Spanish law blindly.85
  
3. A Code is Born (1825)  
 
For the purposes of this presentation, the 1825 Code (of which the official edition 
is entitled Civil Code of the State of Louisiana86) is an important landmark. It is when 
non-pecuniary damages were first included into the civil system of La.87 Therefore, this 
section centers especial attention to this codification work, both in its origins and 
repercussions.  
Legal history surprisingly shows that there seems to have been no act of the La. 
Legislature passed for the express purpose of adopting the 1825 Code. There is an act that 
was approved on April 1824 that orders the printing and promulgation of the 1825 Code 
as amended. 88 The code was distributed on May 1825, and the La. Supreme Court held 
that the 1825 Code was promulgated on various dates in different parts of the state.89 
That act, together with the subsequent abrogation of all previous law, completed the work 
of civilian codification90 in La.  
The 1825 Code had 3,522 articles, having 1,395 articles more than the Digest. Its 
organization and division were quite similar to the ones of the Digest, hence: similar to 
                                                 
85 Id. supra note 68, at 173. 
86 Id. supra note 76, at 48-49. 
87 Note bene that it is referred as with the extension art.1928 (3) provides. 
88 Id. supra note 76, at 48-49. 
89 Id. supra note 76, at 48-49. 
90 Id. supra note 70, at 358. 
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the ones of the French Code.91 Notwithstanding, when comparing both tables of contents, 
it is possible to notice that the 1825 Code addressed topics on which the Digest was 
silent.92 Amongst those topics it is possible to find non-pecuniary damages,93 main point 
of interest for this presentation. 
The abovementioned act of 1824 ordered to print the text in English and French 
(on opposite pages). 94 Then, both the Digest and the 1825 Code were drawn up 
originally in French and translated to English.95 The quality of the translation into 
English has often been criticized by scholars. The promulgation of the 1825 Code did not 
instruct any specific provision for the solution of differences or ambiguities when 
working with the translations. Due to the fact that the original was drafted in French, and 
existing a notorious consent about the poor quality of the English translation, the French 
version was accepted as the controlling text.96
Certain discussion was also opened with regards to the solution that should be 
adopted when facing a conflict between the 1825 Code and the Code of Practice. Finally, 
it was established that the latter should prevail.97
Even when it has been mentioned before, it is worth mentioning that the 
importance of the 1825 Code in the La. legal system depended on the judiciary’s 
application of it in the early years after its enforcement. The La. Supreme Court saw the 
1825 Code merely as an expositive document, believing that it could only change the law 
                                                 
91 Id. supra note 16, at 170. 
92 Id. supra note 73, at 25-26. 
93 With the extend of art. 1928 (3).  
94 Id. supra note 76, at 48-49. 
95 Id. supra note 74, at 12. 
96 Id. supra note 74, at 12. 
97 Id. supra note 76, at 48-49. 
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when reflecting that one of its provisions was utterly at odds with the pre-codified law. It 
was therefore treated as the Digest, and the superior court continued to follow the theory 
of construction that it had applied.98  
The law that existed prior codification, essentially Spanish, was preferred even 
when it contradicted the 1825 Code. As mentioned in previous pages, the Spanish law 
retained its status as an important source of law 99 and was a strong contestant for the 
novel code. In addition, the La. Supreme Court denied retroactive effects to the 1825 
Code. As a result, the court applied Spanish law100 to cases where the cause of action 
antedated 1808 and applied modified Spanish law to those causes which had arisen 
between the years 1808 and 1825.101
Notwithstanding the La. Supreme Court interpretation, art.3521 of the 1825 Code 
intended to terminate the application of all ancient laws and put an end to the 
uncertainties of the past.102 The referred article reads: 
from and after the promulgation of this Code, the Spanish, Roman and 
French laws, which were in force in this state, when Louisiana was 
ceded to the United States, and the acts of the Legislature of the 
Territory of Orleans, and of the Legislature of the State of 
Louisiana…are hereby repealed in every case, for which it has been 
especially provided in this Code, and  that they shall not be invoked as 
laws, even under the pretense that their provisions are not contrary or 
repugnant to those of this Code.103
 
                                                 
98 RICHARD KILBOURNE, A HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE. THE FORMATIVE YEARS 1803-1839  
131 (1987). 
99 Id. supra note 98, at 131. 
100 Spanish law in its pure form,  i.e. Spanish texts with or without English translation  
101 Id. supra note 98, at 131. 
102 Id. supra note 74, at 11. 
103 Id. supra note 43, at 1112.  
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The repeal had been added by the La. Legislature, and was not found in the 
original draft submitted by the codifiers. Nevertheless, the article could be read as not 
repealing all prior law, for it only applied in every case, for which it has been especially 
provided in this code. That allowed the possibility of searching for limits to the express 
repeal. If facing no specially provided rule under the code, a recourse to a special rule 
under prior law (if one existed) could be made.104 The La. Supreme Court got hold to that 
interpretation in Cole's Widow v. His Executors.105  
In order to stop that kind of interpretation, the La. Legislature passed two acts.106 
There has been intense scholarly argumentation related to the effects of both acts, and it 
can be concluded that Spanish and French jurisprudence (due to case law) and doctrine 
are still consulted by La. courts when rendering decisions.107
The 1825 Code fostered its applicability during the mid Nineteenth Century due 
to court decisions and doctrinal developments. Reaching the turn of the century, in 1870, 
it was subject to a revision. That revision is the starting point for the following Chapter of 
this presentation. 
 
 
   
                                                 
104 Id. supra note 38, at 246. 
105  Cole’s Widow v. His Executors, 7 Mart. (n.s.) 41. 
106 See supra note 45. 
107 Id. supra note 76, at 48-49. 
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Chapter III 
After the Enforcement of the First Civil Code 
 
 
This Chapter focuses its attention to the changes the La. Legislature introduced 
into the La. Civil law system as from the mid Nineteenth Century. It has been mentioned 
supra, that by means of the Digest and the 1825 Code, La. was able to protect its Spanish 
and French heritage from the imminent invasion of the Common law system. Time and 
necessity forced revisions to the 1825 Code; a code that was not able to survive 
unchanged a complete century, but that survived far more than the Digest. 
 
1. A First Revision Reaching the End of the Nineteenth Century(1870) 
 
For approximately half a Century the 1825 Code was able to survive without any 
alteration. It existed, at that time, a request for amendments to its provisions. The legal 
practice and scholarly108 opinions demanded changes in the wording of the 1825 Code. In 
addition, the Civil War was reaching an end and the State of La. had to adapt its 
regulations to the Federal directions related especially to property. Therefore, and as the 
result of a revision of the 1825 Code, in 1870 the La. Legislature adopted a new civil 
code for the State. 
As mentioned in the previous Chapter, the Digest and the 1825 Code could be 
defined as elaborations with dogmatic and scientific background. On the other hand, the 
                                                 
108 It should be understood that at that time the main scholar opinions were done by lawyers that practiced 
in the State. 
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1870 Code was not the product of a scientific redaction. It was little if anything, not more 
than a modernized version of its antecessor.109  
Two aspects must be analyzed when studding the 1870 Code: the structure; and 
on the substance or content. Regarding the first aspect, it may be said that the French 
heritage110 had been strongly attacked. Hence, the 1870 Code was published solely in 
English.111 This was perhaps one of the most significant differences with the pervious 
legal tools of the region, because as it has been already mentioned, the Digest and the 
1825 Code had been both published in French and English. 
The changes incorporated into the code, and that will be mentioned infra, forced 
the need to renumber the articles for the 1870 Code. Notwithstanding that renumbering, 
the formal structure of the 1825 Code survived. 112  
Regarding the second aspect, i.e. the substance or content, it has been said that the 
1870 Code was substantially the 1825 Code,113 with some alterations that were not really 
significant, or that at least did not change its essence. The underlying theory and the 
substance of most of the institutions of the 1825 Code survived. 114  
The changes in content introduced by the 1870 Code can be summarized by 
saying that they merely: (i) eliminated provisions regarding slavery; (ii) incorporated 
statutory amendments made by the La. Legislature since 1825; and (iii) integrated acts 
                                                 
109 Robert Lee Tullis, The Louisiana Civil Law, in the Light of its Origin and Development, reprinted from 
II 2 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL 301, 301 (1938). 
110 When making reference to French heritage, at this point, is intended to mean the use of French language 
in the State.    
111 A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, 1 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 65 (1971). 
112 Id. supra note 111. 
113 Id. supra note 111. 
114 Id. supra note 111. 
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passed since 1825, which dealt with matters that had not officially amended the 1825 
Code. 115 Amongst the main considerations it is possible to mention the results of the 
revisory legislation of the year 1855 which was never able to replace the 1825 Code. 
As a result of those few and not significant changes, a reader who compares the 
1870 Code with the 1825 Code will find many coincidences and similarities in their 
provisions. 116 In brief, the 1870 Code was a simple work of clerical compilation117 that 
at that moment had turned mandatory for the growing State of La. The 1870 Code also 
represented a change and modernization that would again help the civil system to survive 
and enter the Twentieth Century.  
 
2. A Revision for the New Century(1948) 
 
With the dawn of a new Century the need of a new code was reborn. There had 
been changed conditions and the conceptual framework of the 1870 Code had proved to 
be analytically deficient in certain instances. 118  
Perhaps, due to the sources and materials with which it was built, the 1870 Code 
had concepts that were sometimes blurred and presented a number of contradictions. 
Even more, the courts had provided interesting interpretations and the La. Legislature had 
been repealing or amending a substantial number of articles. 119 With time, other La. 
statutes covering civil law matters, that had been originally left outside the wording of the 
                                                 
115 Id. supra note 111. 
116 Id. supra note 109, at 301. 
117 Id. supra note 29, at 20. 
118 Id. supra note 111, at 67-68. 
119 Id. supra note 111, at 67-68. 
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1870 Code, had become part of the Title 9 of the La. Revised Statutes. 120 Facing such 
scenario made a revision to the existing code mandatory.  
It has been said also that the need of revision in La. not only pursued systematic 
interests, it also tried to create a clear harmony between the “law in the books” (i.e. the 
word of the 1870 Code) and the “living law” (i.e. the law created by practice in and out of 
court).121 That lack of harmony was a growing problem present in the legal activities in 
the region of La.  
Pushed by the objective and need of updating the existing civil law in the region, 
the La. Legislature instructed the La. State Law Institute, which was created in 1938, to 
revise the 1870 Code.  
In order to fulfill its duty, the La. State Law Institute faced three possible work 
projects: i) purify the linguistic, eliminate the obsolete provisions and update the norms; 
ii) undertake a structural revision that would start by a deep analysis of the grounds for 
each institution, followed by a study of the existing case law and hence providing a new 
wording for the articles; and iii) perform a partial revisions of the 1870 Code. The La. 
State Law Institute finally opted for the third possible way,122 and started to work with 
that criterion beginning in 1948.  
A brief bullet-point including all partial amendments to the 1870 Code, till the 
elaboration of this presentation, is provided below:123
                                                 
120 Id. supra note 111, at 67-68. 
121 Id. supra note 111, at 67-68. 
122 Id. supra note 15, at 135. 
123 Only the amended parts are mentioned, and in parenthesis appears the year of revision. The review is not 
chronological. It begins at the front of the Code and develops book by book, title by title, and chapter by 
chapter rather than according to the respective dates of enactment 
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 Preliminary Title (1987)  
Chapters 1 and 2 (1987) 
Chapter 3 (1987 and 1991) 
Book I (revision not completed) 
Title I -Natural and Juridical Personas- (1987)  
Title II -Absent Persons- (1990)  
Title IV -Husband and Wife- (1987) 
Title V -Divorce- (1990 and 1997)  
Title VII -Parent and Child- (1993) 
Chapter 2 (1976) 
Title IX -Persons Unable to Care for Their Persons or Property- (2000) 
Book II (Titles I to VI revised by a series of legislative acts from 1976 to 1979)  
Title I -Things-  
Title II -Ownership-  
Title III -Personal Servitudes-   
Title IV -Predial Servitudes- 
Title V -Building Restrictions- 
Title VI -Boundaries-  
Title VII -Ownership in Indivision- (added in 1990) 
Book III (amendments are very disperse)  
Preliminary Title (1981) 
Title I -of Successions-  
Chapters 1-3 (1981) 
Chapters 4-6 and 13 (1997) 
Title II -of Donations Inter Vivos and Mortis Causa- 
Chapter 2 (1991)  
Chapter 3 (1996) 
Chapter 4 (2001) 
Chapter 6 (1997 and 2001)  
Chapters 8 and 9 (2004) 
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Title III -Obligations in General- (1984)  
Title IV -Conventional Obligations or Contracts- (1984)  
Title V -Obligations arising Without Agreement-  
Chapters 1 and 2 (1995)  
Title VI -Matrimonial Regimes- (1979) 
Title VII -Sales- (1993)  
Title IX -of Lease-  
Chapters 1 and 2 (2004) 
Title XI -Partnership- (1980)  
Title XII -of Loan- (2004) 
Title XIII -Deposit and Sequestration- (2003)  
Title XVI -Suretyship- (1987) 
Title XV -Representation and Mandate- (1997) 
Title XXII -Mortgages- (1991 and 1992)  
Title XXIII -Occupancy and Possession- (1982) 
Title XXIV -Prescription- (1982 and 1983)  
Book IV -Conflict of Laws- (added in 1991) 124  
 
The information provided above, together with some specific studies, reflect that 
only Books II and IV can be considered as totally complete. In addition, it has been 
estimated that approximately 72% of the 1870 Code has been fully revised. Therefore, 
28% of the 1870 Code remains still effective, and many old provisions coexist and 
interact with the new wording.125
For specific purposes of this presentation, it is necessary to mention that 
according to the bullet point provided above, contract law in La. had two mayor revisions 
                                                 
124 This information was developed from A. N. Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, LOUISIANA 
CIVIL CODE 2005 EDITION XLV- LVII (2005), and complemented by the author of this presentation. 
125 Vernon Palmer, The French Connection and The Spanish Perception: Historical Debates and 
Contemporary Evaluation of French Influence on Louisiana Civil Law, 63 La. L. Rev. 1067, 1112 (2003).  
 30
– on the law of obligations, and on sales. 126 The 1984 Revision is the one which will 
comeback to the reader with more intensity while advancing through the different 
sections of this presentation. 
Continuing with contract law it is worth mentioning that, even after the new 
revisions, art.2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) has not been directly adopted in 
La.  
The lack of a direct application of art.2 of the UCC in La. is an important 
difference between the civil law in the region and the common-law states. 
Notwithstanding, the preeminent common-law statute has made its way into the New 
Code. For instance, with trusts, the UCC rules met with no particular resistance in the 
civil code because there were no rules at this level of detail present in the Code to 
interfere with their application. Therefore, the revision of Sales (Book III, Title VII) 
included a new chapter (chapter 13) that added amongst other things: (i) battle of the 
forms; (ii) right of inspection for the buyer; (iii) right of rejection of nonconforming 
goods for the buyer; (iv) acceptance of nonconforming things by the buyer; and (v) right 
to cure nonconformity for the seller. 127  
The revision comments to the civil code make clear that the incorporated rules are 
‘new’, and suggest that they are consistent with the provisions and spirit of the 1870 
Code. Hence, the dominant civilian grounding prevails in the civil law system of La. 
whenever analyzing or applying the articles of the civil code related to Sales.128  
 
                                                 
126 Id. supra note 14, at 457. 
127 Id. supra note 14, at 457. 
128 Id. supra note 14, at 457. 
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Second Part 
Non-Pecuniary Damages 
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Chapter IV 
Damages that Exceed Economic Interests 
 
 
 The Second Part of this presentation helps readers to focus their attention to the 
study of non-pecuniary damages in La. It also allows readers not to ignore the historical 
grounding that was provided in the First Part. Together with that initial information, this 
Part will help develop a complete understanding of the area of the law under study.  
Before limiting the comment and analysis to the codification and regulations in 
La., it is worth providing a general understanding of the area of law that gives the name 
to this Chapter, i.e. non-pecuniary damages. With that objective, two different 
approaches, from two different starting points, will lead to similar results. Those starting 
points are non-patrimonial damages and moral damages. 
 
1. Non-Patrimonial Damages 
   
The failure of a party in an obligation to fulfill his or her commitment may cause 
a detriment or damage to the other party’s interests or assets. Those interests or assets 
may be of no patrimonial nature, because not all the rights of a person fall within his or 
her patrimony.129 In other words, it is generally accepted that not all rights are of a 
patrimonial nature.130
                                                 
129 Saul Litvinoff, 6 LA. CIV. L. TREATISE, Law Of Obligations § 6.1 (2d ed.) (www.westlaw.com). 
130 1 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW OF PROPERTY 218 (1966) cited by Id. infra note 139, at 1. 
 33
Initially, and in a very general manner, it may be said that non-pecuniary damages 
are those injuries that cannot be measured in pecuniary terms.131 Also, in a 
complementary way it can be added that they are injuries that are not able to be 
‘appreciated in money’, i.e. not capable of a precise monetary calculation. 132 This 
category of damages includes, amongst others and not in a limited way: mental anguish, 
annoyance, inconvenience, psychic damage, humiliation, embarrassment,133 mental 
suffering, or even emotional distress.134
Continuing with the same development of ideas, it could be repeated that some 
fundamental rights are not regarded as part of a person’s patrimony,135 although it could 
be added that to violate or jeopardize the referred fundamental rights may have an 
adverse impact on the feelings of the holder of such rights and may give rise to potential 
claims that seek patrimonial reparations.136
Therefore, and contemplating the above mentioned, the expression non-pecuniary 
damages is not totally accurate, because a claim for a damage to a non-pecuniary right is 
generally regarded as pecuniary in nature, and commonly repaired with money.137  
                                                 
131 Gary P. Graphia,  Non Pecuniary Damages: A Guide to Damage Awards under Louisiana Civil Code 
Article 1998, 50 La. L. Rev. 797, 797 (1990). 
132 Henri Wolbrette III, Damages Ex Contractu: Recovery of Nonpecuniary Damages for Breach of 
Contract under Louisiana Civil Code Article 1934, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1160, 1161 (1974). 
133 Id. supra note 132, at 1161.  
134 Westesen v. Olathe State Bank, 78 Colo. 217, 240 P. 689 (1925); Dawson v. Associates Fin. Serv. Co., 
215 Kan. 814, 529 P.2d 104 (1974); Batson v. Bean, 208 Ky. 295, 270 S. W. 801 (1925); Miholevich v. 
Mid-West Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 261 Mich. 495, 246 N.W. 202 (1933); Dallas v. Brown, 150 S. W.2d 129 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941) cited by Id. infra note 139, at 1.  
135 Id. supra note 129, at § 6.1.  
136 1 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW OF PROPERTY 218 (1966) cited by Id. infra note 139, at 1. 
137 Id. supra note 129, at § 6.1. 
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 2. Moral Damages 
 
The second starting point that may be used to reach a concept for non-pecuniary 
damages is the one that gives title to this subsection.  
Initially, it must be said that moral damages can be understood as a species 
included in the gender of non-patrimonial damages. Therefore, there can be damages that 
jeopardize non-economic interests and that may have no moral connotations. 
Tracing the origin of moral damages, it is mandatory to refer to the French 
jurisprudence and doctrine. There, it is possible to find dommage moral and prejudice 
moral. These terms are generally used to define a damage inflicted to interests or assets 
not strictly patrimonial.138  
When looking towards other civil law regions, it is useful to refer to Latin 
America. In those countries the concept of daño moral has been accepted. The daño 
moral has a similar application as the one given by the French jurisprudence to dommage 
moral.  
One of the most eminent scholars of the civil law system inside La. has stated that 
greater terminological accuracy would be achieved by adopting in the English language 
the expression moral damages, rather than non-pecuniary or non-patrimonial damages. 
Moral damages should then be applied to designate those damages that are awarded as 
reparation for a loss that, due to its experience in the subjective sphere of a person’s 
                                                 
138 7 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 182 (2D ED. ESMEIN TRANS. 
1954); P. WEILL, DROIT CIVIL – LES OBLIGATIONS 427 (1971) cited by Id. infra note 139, at 1.  
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feelings, is not strictly pecuniary.139  In addition, it has been accepted by the support 
provided by other important scholarly opinions, that inside the common law system, 
moral damages are all damages for non-pecuniary loss recoverable under a breached 
contract in certain situations.140
Hence, at this point it is important to share the idea that there should be no 
semantic obstacle to borrow from the French doctrine and to speak of moral damages 
when referring to damages that cannot be viewed as sustained by a person’s patrimony, 
or damages to an interest for which a current market-value cannot be readily 
ascertained.141
Notwithstanding, during the last century, the expression moral damages has in 
fact been used by the courts in La. when rendering opinions; while the less clear 
expression non-pecuniary damages is the one currently used in most English legal 
parlance when trying to mean the reparation owed for a loss that is other than 
patrimonial. 142  That is the reason why, even when preferring the term moral damages, 
this presentation refers to non-pecuniary damages rather than moral damages.  
As closing words it is worth mentioning, even when its treatment exceeds this 
presentation, that a clear relation between non-pecuniary and pecuniary loss is found 
when: (i) a loss of a non-pecuniary nature results from a pecuniary one; and (ii) a loss of 
a pecuniary nature follows a loss which is non-pecuniary. 143  
                                                 
139 Saul Litvinoff, Moral Damages, 38 La. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1977).  
140 N. Stephan Kinsella, A Civil Law to Common Law Dictionary, 54 La. L. Rev. 1265, 1281 (1994). 
141 Id. supra note 139, at 1. 
142 Id. supra note 129, at § 6.1. 
143 Id. supra note 129, at § 6.4.  
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On the other hand, it is difficult to find a clear relation between non-pecuniary 
and pecuniary losses when a non-pecuniary loss is neither the result, nor the cause, of 
another pecuniary loss.144 Due to that difficulty, some French scholars stated the 
existence of a moral patrimony of persons, consisting of intangible assets (e.g. honor, 
reputation, feelings, and peace of mind). That moral patrimony has two types of assets: 
social and emotional.145
 
 
                                                 
144 Id. supra note 129, at § 6.4. 
145 Id. supra note 129, at § 6.4. 
 37
Chapter V 
Article 1928: A Cornerstone for Non-Pecuniary Damages 
  
 
 Having provided a general idea regarding non-pecuniary damages, it is interesting 
to focus the analysis into the region of La. The following Chapters of this Second Part, 
together with the Third Part, will provide a complete analysis. 
 
1. An Introduction to the Recovery of Non-Pecuniary Damages in La.  
 
Initially, and as to provide a clear introduction for the reader when studying non-
pecuniary damages in La., it is useful to develop in the following paragraphs a brief 
preliminary explanation.  
In La., the basic elements of recovery for non-pecuniary damages were set out 
originally in art.1928 of the 1825 Code. This article was included in Section 4 of the 
Damages Resulting from the Inexecution [from the French Inexécution] of Obligations, 
Chapter 3 of the Effect of Obligations, Title 4 of Conventional Obligations, of the Book 
III of the Different Modes of Acquiring the Property of Things. 
When the 1870 Code was enacted, the text of art.1928 was maintained with 
practically the same wording.146 The only change the provision suffered was with respect 
to the number that corresponded to the article inside the La. Civil Code. The original 
number 1928 was changed to 1934. 
                                                 
146 To identify the exact differences vide Chapter X of this presentation. 
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All that has been mentioned in the previous Chapter regarding non-pecuniary 
damages must be considered when referring to La. In addition, the text of art.1934 
(former art.1928) provided, as a general rule, for recovery of the loss sustained, as well as 
the profit lost by the creditor. The general rule was tempered by determining whether: (i) 
the breach was in good or bad faith; (ii) the damages were foreseeable at the initiation of 
the contract or consequential; and (iii) the damages were pecuniary or non-pecuniary.147
Due to the fact that the application of art.1934 proved to be difficult and not 
peaceful, and that cases with similar factual situations had different outcomes, the La. 
State Law Institute proposed, under the initiative of the La. Legislature, a new text that 
would replace art.1934.148 That new text came with the 1984 Revision and together with 
the new wording that provides art.1998. 
At present day, the ruling provision for the recovery of non-pecuniary damages in 
La. is found in art.1998 of the 1984 Revision. That provision is currently incorporated 
into the New Code.  
For the purposes of this presentation, the focus must be centered on art.1928 
during the years of its existence, i.e. 1825 to 1870. Even though the text of art.1934 is 
practically the same as the one of art.1928, the objective of this presentation is to limit its 
study to the period of years above mentioned, and not to extend after the year 1870.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
147 Id. supra note 132, at 1160. 
148 Id. supra note 131, at 797.  
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2. A View of the Innovative Text  
 
 At this point it is necessary to provide the reader with a transcription of art.1928. 
Such transcription will help understand the invocation that the codifiers did to the 
institution of non-pecuniary damages inside the 1825 Code.  
Special attention must be rendered when reading art.1928 (3) (it has been 
emphasized in bold) due to the fact it is the grounding provision for the application of 
non-pecuniary damages in La. 
 
Art. 1928- Where the object of the contract is any thing but the 
payment of money, the damages due to the creditor for its breach are 
the amount of the loss he has sustained, and the profit of which he has 
been deprived, under the following exceptions and modifications: 
1. When the debtor has been guilty of no fraud or bad faith, he is liable 
only for such damages as were contemplated, or may reasonably be 
supposed to have entered into the contemplation of the parties at the 
time of the contract. By bad faith in this and the next rule, is not meant 
the mere breach of faith in not complying with the contract, but a 
designed breach of it from some motive of interest or ill will; 
2. When the inexecution of the contract has proceeded from fraud or 
bad faith, the debtor shall not only be liable to such damages as were, 
or might have been foreseen at the time of making the contract, but 
also to such as are the immediate and direct consequences of the 
breach of that contract; but even when there is fraud, the damages 
cannot exceed this; 
3. Although the general rule is, that damages are the amount of the 
loss the creditor has sustained, or of the gain of which he has been 
deprived, yet there are cases in which damages may be assessed 
without calculating altogether on the pecuniary loss, or the privation 
of pecuniary gain to the party. Where the contract has for its object 
the gratification of some intellectual enjoyment, whether in religion, 
morality, or taste, or some convenience or other legal gratification, 
although these are not appreciated in money by the parties, yet 
damages are due for their breach: a contract for a religious or 
charitable foundation, a promise of marriage, or an engagement for 
a work of some of the fine arts, are objects and examples of this rule. 
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In the assessment of damages under this rule, as well as in cases of 
offences, quasi offences, and quasi contracts, much discretion must 
be left to the judge or jury, while in other cases they have none, but 
are bound to give such damages under the above rules as will fully 
indemnify the creditors, whenever the contract has been broken by 
the fault, negligence, fraud or bad faith of the debtor; 
4. If the creditor be guilty of any bad faith, which retards or prevents 
the execution of the contract, or if, at the time of making it, he knew of 
any facts that must prevent or delay its performance, and concealed 
them from the debtor, he is not entitled to damages; 
5. Where the parties, by their contract, have determined the sum that 
shall be paid as damages for its breach, the creditor must recover that 
sum, but is not entitled to more. But when the contract is not executed 
in part, the damages agreed on by the parties may be reduced to the 
loss really suffered, and the gain of which the party has been deprived, 
unless there has been an express agreement that the sum fixed by the 
contract shall be paid, even on a partial breach of the agreement. 149
 
Looking back to art.1928 (3), it is important that the provision extends the 
analysis to some intellectual enjoyment, whether in religion, morality, or taste, or some 
convenience or other legal gratification, although these are not appreciated in money by 
the parties, yet damages are due for their breach: a contract for a religious or charitable 
foundation, a promise of marriage, or an engagement for a work of some of the fine arts, 
are objects and examples of this rule. 150 Such extension may easily be assimilated to the 
examples provided in Chapter IV of this presentation, when speaking of non-patrimonial 
and moral damages. Hence, it is clear that the codifiers made an allusion to non-
pecuniary damages, and that according to the wording of art.1928 (3) where the object of 
the contract is not appreciable in money, the creditor may recover non-pecuniary 
damages for breach of the contract under the conditions enumerated in the art.151
                                                 
149 Id. supra note 43, at 626. 
150 Id. supra note 43, at 628.  
151 Id. supra note 132, at 1161. 
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Another significant point of art.1928 (3) is the inclusion of a judge or jury with 
much discretion at the moment of the assessment of damages under the provisions of the 
article. As will be mentioned later, such inclusion was a big innovation at that historical 
moment, and it did not exist in the Project.  
 
3. Sources for the Novel Text  
 
Notwithstanding the broad treatment that will be given to this area of study in the 
next Chapter of this presentation, it enriches the reader to briefly notice some aspects 
related to the sources of inspiration for the text of art.1928 of the 1825 Code.  
As has been mentioned in Chapter II of this presentation, the redactors of the 
1825 Code (i.e. Derbigny, Livingston, and Moreau-Lislet)152 followed the French Code 
closely and relied on the doctrine and jurisprudence that followed its promulgation. They 
also identified the sources of most proposed amendments, deletions, and additions to be 
done to the Digest. Amongst the sources they worked with, it is possible to mention: (i) 
the treatises of Domat, Pothier, and Toullier; (ii) the Digest of Justinian; (iii) the Partidas; 
(iv) Febrero; and (v) other Spanish materials. 153  
Although the sources of inspiration that the codifiers relied on have not been 
limited to French productions, the 1825 Code contains mostly provisions that have an 
equivalent in the French Code. 154 Such inclusion in the 1825 Code could have been a 
                                                 
152 Id. supra note 73, at 25. 
153 Id. supra note 111, at 62. 
154 Id. supra note 111, at 62. 
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practical necessity due to the scarcity of coherent doctrinal works in the region,155 and the 
imminent threat that the common law influence enforced on the region. 
Both the French Code and the 1825 Code, in their treatments of conventional 
obligations (or contracts), expressed a general commitment to human autonomy and the 
doctrine of freedom of contract. Therefore, men were the best judges of their interests and 
could freely contract to achieve their goals as long as their goals were not banned by 
law.156 Even when that same general principal was shared amongst both bodies of law, 
the redactors of the 1825 Code introduced new features 157 that tended to modify other 
aspects of conventional obligations.  
As a result, although it received a strong influence from the French Code, the 
1825 Code did not lose some distinctive characters that came from its own cultural 
background.158 Amongst those distinctive characters it is possible to find some provisions 
regarding obligations, and with particular interest for this presentation: art.1928. 
                                                 
155 Id. supra note 111, at 62. 
156 Id. supra note 57, at 38. 
157 Id. supra note 68, at 174. 
158 ABELARDO LEVAGGI, DALMACIO VELEZ SARSFIELD - JURISCONSULTO 195 (2005). 
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Chapter VI 
The Uniqueness of Article 1928  
 
 
 The last Section of the previous Chapter of this presentation briefly introduced a 
study of the sources of inspiration of art.1928 (3). At this point it is necessary to develop 
in a deeper extent aspects of its uniqueness. Therefore, a development of such uniqueness 
in an individual Chapter turns out to be useful. 
 
1. Concordances with Local and Foreign Sources  
 
The La. Legal Archives provides a useful table of concordances amongst the texts 
of the French Code, the Digest, the Project, the 1825 Code, and the 1870 Code.159
Referring to that table of concordances is mandatory when trying to understand 
the development that different provisions of the civil codification suffered in La. during 
the entire Nineteenth Century.  
By tracing the origins of art.1928, and according to the mentioned table of 
concordances, it is possible to state that the following provisions were measured by the 
codifiers of art.1928 of the 1825 Code: (i) art.1149160, 1151161 and 1152162 of the French 
                                                 
159 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES VOLUME 3 “ 2 COMPLIED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA” 
PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO ACT 165 OF THE LEGISLATURE OF LOUISIANA OF 1938, 2043 (1942) 
160 Art. 1149. The damages and interest due to the creditor are, in general, to the amount of the loss which 
he has sustained or of the gain of which he has been deprived; saving the exceptions and modifications 
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Code; (ii) art. 49,163 51164 and 52165 from page 268 of the Digest; and (iii) the proposed 
text of page 258166 of the Project.167
                                                                                                                                                 
following. According to CODE NAPOLEON OR THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE LITERALLY TRANSLATED FROM THE 
ORIGINAL AND OFFICIAL EDITION, PUBLISHED AT PARIS, IN 1804 314 (1960). 
161 Art. 1151. Even in the case where the non-performance of the contract results from the fraud of the 
debtor, the damages and interest must not comprehend, as regards the loss sustained by the creditor and 
the gain of which he has been derived, any thing which is not immediate and direct consequence of the non-
performance of the contract. According to Id. supra note 160, at 314. 
162 Art. 1152. When the agreement imports that he who shall fail in executing it shall pay a certain sum 
under the title of damages, there can be allowed to the other party neither a greater nor a less sum. 
According to Id. supra note 160, at 314. 
163 Art. 49. The damages due to the creditor are generally for the loss he has sustained and the profit he has 
been deprived of, under the following exceptions and modifications. According to A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL 
LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS (1808) A REPRINT OF MOREAU LISLET’S COPY 
CONTAINING MANUSCRIPT REFERENCES TO ITS SOURCES AND OTHER CIVIL LAWS ON THE SAME SUBJECTS 
268 (1968). 
164 Art. 51. Even in case the non execution of the contract resulted from the fraud of the debtor, the 
damages for the loss sustained by the creditor, and the profit of which he has been deprived, must not 
exceed what has been the immediate and direct consequence of the non execution of the contract. 
According to Id. supra note 163, at 268. 
165 Art. 52. When the contract specifies that he who fails to execute it, shall pay a certain sum by way of 
damages, the other party can recover neither a larger nor a smaller sum. According to Id. supra note 163, 
at 268. 
166 According to LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES VOLUME 1 “ A REPUBLICATION OF THE PROJECT OF THE 
CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA OF 1825” PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO ACT 286 OF THE LEGISLATURE OF 
LOUISIANA OF 1936 (1937), the text of the Project that was source for art.1928 reads as follows (in bold the 
differences with the text of art.1928 are emphasized): Art.[___] - “Where the object of the contract is any 
thing but the payment of money,” the damages due to the creditor for its breach are the amount of the loss 
he has sustained, and the profit of which he has been deprived, under the following exceptions and 
modifications: 
1. When the debtor has been guilty of no fraud or bad faith, he is liable only for such damages as were 
contemplated, or may reasonably be supposed to have entered into the contemplation of the parties at the 
time of the contract. By bad faith in this, and the next rule, is not meant the mere breach of faith in not 
complying with the contract, but a designed breach of it from some motive of interest or ill will. 
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Another important scholarly contribution indicates, during the mid Nineteenth 
Century, that art.1928 found grounding in arts.1050,168 1051,169 1052,170 and 1140171 of 
                                                                                                                                                 
2. When the inexecution of the contract has proceeded from fraud or bad faith, the debtor shall not only be 
liable to such damages as were, or might have been foreseen at the time of making the contract, but also to 
such as are the immediate and direct consequences of the breach of the contract - but even when there is 
fraud, the damages cannot exceed this. 
3. Although the general rule is, that damages are the amount of the loss the creditor has sustained, or of the 
gain of which he has been deprived, yet there are cases in which damages may be assessed without 
calculating altogether [the 1825 Code added the word “on”] the pecuniary loss, or the privation of 
pecuniary gain to the party. Where the contract has for its object the gratification of some intellectual 
enjoyment, whether in religion, morality or taste, or some convenience, or other legal gratification; 
although these are not appreciated in money by the parties, yet damages are due for their breach: a 
contract for a religious or charitable foundation, a promise of marriage, or an engagement for a work of 
some of the fine arts, are objects and examples of this rule. 
In the assessment of damages under this rule, as well as in cases of offences, quasi offences and quasi 
contracts, much discretion must be left to the judge [the 1825 Code added the words “or jury”], while in 
other cases he has none; but is bound to give such damages under the above rules as will fully indemnify 
the creditors whenever the contract has been broken by the fault, negligence, fraud or bad faith of the 
debtor. 
4. If the creditor is guilty of any bad faith which retards or prevents the execution of the contract, or if at 
the time of making it he knew of any facts that must prevent or delay its performance and concealed them 
from the debtor, he is not entitled to damages. 
5. Where the parties by their contract have determined the sum that shall be paid as damages for its 
breach; the creditor must recover that sum, but is not entitled to more. But when the contract is not 
executed in part, the damages agreed on by the parties may be reduced to the loss really suffered, and the 
gain of which the party has been deprived, unless there has been an express agreement that the sum fixed 
by the contract shall be paid, even on a partial breach of the agreement. 
167 Id. supra note 159, at 2055. 
168 Art. 1050. The dispositions allowed by the two preceding articles, shall only be valid as far as the 
condition of restitution shall be for the benefit of all the children born and to be born of the party subjected 
thereto, without exception or preference of age or sex. According to Id. supra note 160, at 288. 
169 Art. 1051. If in the cases mentioned above, the party subjected to restitution for the benefit of his 
children, dies, leaving children in the first degree and descendants of a child previously deceased, such last 
shall receive, by representation, the portion of the child previously deceased. According to Id. supra note 
160, at 288. 
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the French Code. 172 Due to the fact that the areas of law covered by the referred arts. of 
the French Code are not compatible with art.1928 of the 1825 Code, it must be assumed 
that the scholarly contribution incurred a material error when analyzing art.1928. 
Probably, even though impossible to be assured, the contribution intended to refer to 
arts.1150, 1151 and 1152 of the French Code. This last assumption would make the 
analysis compatible to the one made by Professor Batiza almost 100 years later. 
Finally, it has been added that the Digest contained a duplication of the provision 
of the French Code, and that a reference to art. 46 to 52173 of the Digest is necessary to 
understand the provision.174
                                                                                                                                                 
170 Art. 1052. If the child, the brother or the sister to whom property shall have been given by act during 
life, without charge of restitution, accept a new gift made by act during life testamentary, on condition that 
the property previously conferred shall be encumbered with such charge, it is no longer permitted them to 
divide the two dispositions made for their benefit, or to renounce the second in order to get possession of 
the first, even though they should offer to restore the property comprised in the second disposition. 
According to Id. supra note 160, at 288. 
171 Art. 1140. The effects of the obligation to give or to deliver an immoveable are regulated under the title 
“Of Sales,” and under the title “Of Privileges and Mortgages.” According to Id. supra note 160, at 311. 
172 P. J. A. DESLIX, ANNOTATIONS ON THE LOUISIANA CODES OR THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT GENERAL 
INDEX AND DIGEST FROM 1809 TO FEBRUARY 1843 668 (1847). 
173 For the complete transcription of articles vide supra notes 162, 163, 164:  
Art. 46. Damages are due only when the debtor has delayed to fulfill his obligation, except however when 
the thing which the debtor had obliged himself to give or do, could have been given or done only at certain 
time, which he has suffered to elapse. 
Art. 47. The debtor is condemned if there be occasion, to the payment of damages, either on account of the 
non execution of the obligation, or on account of the delay of execution, whenever he fails to prove that the 
non execution is owing to some extraneous cause, not to be imputed to him, and that there is no want of 
good faith on his part. 
Art. 48. There is no room for any damages, when by irresistible force, or a fortuitous event, the debtor has 
been hindered from giving or doing what he was obliged to give or do, or has been compelled to do what 
he was bound not to do.  
 47
  
2. Doctrinal and Jurisprudential Contributions  
 
It has been said that there is no equivalent for art.1928 (3) in the French Code or 
the Digest. Unlike the French Code, art.1928 (3) of the 1825 Code contemplates damages 
of a non-patrimonial or moral nature.175
Art.1928 (3) first appears without numeration in the Project, and it has been 
suggested that the redactors of the Project were influenced by Domat. The French jurist 
provided an example in which an architect undertook the building of a house for a 
landlord who had acquired a tenant and failed to fulfill the work within the agreed period 
of time. If facing that scenario, the architect could be liable for three different losses:176 
that of the expense of rebuilding the house, the loss of the rent which the landlord ought 
to have had, and that of the damages which the landlord will be liable for to the tenant 
for disappointing him of his house.177  
Professor Batiza mentions in his monumental work regarding the sources of the 
Project178 that amongst the sources of inspiration for art.1928 (3) it is possible to find the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Art. 50. The debtor is liable only to such damages as were foreseen, or might have been foreseen at the 
time of contracting, when it is not owing to his fraud, that the obligation has not been executed.  
According to Id. supra note 163, at 268. 
174 Saul Litvinoff, Obligations 2, 7 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE §180 (1975). 
175 Id. supra note 139, at 6.  
176 Id. supra note 132, at 1173. 
177 J. Domat, 1 Les Loix Civiles Dans Leur Ordre Naturel (1777), Book III, tit, V, 2, No. 11, 776 (Cushing 
ed. 1850) cited by Id. supra note 132, at 1173.  
178 Rodolfo Batiza, The Actual Sources of the Louisiana Project of 1823: A General Analytical Survey, 47 
Tul. L. Rev. 1 (1972). 
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works of both Toullier179 and Domat180 (early commentators of the French Code). He 
states that the influence of these French jurists was partial with respect to the first 
paragraph of art.1928 (3) and that it was substantial with respect to the second paragraph 
of art.1928 (3).181  
Professor Batiza also mentions that the text of the 1825 Code adopted almost 
verbatim the letter of the Project182from page 259183 and that the 1870 Code adopted 
verbatim184 the text of the 1825 Code.185
As a conclusion it may be said that, due to the fact the French Code had no similar 
text to art.1928 of the 1825 Code and according to the abovementioned, the redactors in 
La. were able to incorporate into the text of art.1928 what the French searched for with 
doctrinal interpretations and developments. In fact, the fundamental articles of the French 
Code (i.e. art.1149 and 1150) had been introduced into the Digest, and, therefore, 
                                                 
179 C.B.M. Toullier, 6 Le Droit Civil Francais, Suivant l’Ordre du Code (1821), Liv. III, Tit. III, Chap. III, 
Sec. IV, § III, n. 293 (305 seqq) cited by Id. supra note 178, at 80.  
180 Domat, 1 Loix Civiles, Part. I, Liv. III, Tit. V, Sec. II, ns.  XI, XII (270) cited by Id. supra note 178, at 
80. 
181 Id. supra note 178, at 80. 
182 Vide supra footnote 165. 
183 The author of this presentation consulted LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES VOLUME 1 “ A REPUBLICATION 
OF THE PROJECT OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA OF 1825” PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO ACT 286 OF THE 
LEGISLATURE OF LOUISIANA OF 1936 (1937), and must mention that Professor Batiza apparently has made a 
material error when mentioning that the sources for art.1928 were found in page 259 of the Project. By 
checking in the text of the Project, it is possible to notice that the correct page were the sources of art. 1928 
start to be mention is page 258.  
184 To identify the exact differences vide Chapter X of this presentation.  
185 Id. supra note 178, at 80. 
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art.1928 expressed in precise terms the conclusions of the French doctrine that the 
codifiers of the 1825 Code had pursued.186
 
3. More about the Originality of the Provision 
     
As mentioned supra, since the 1825 Code, La. has been one of the few countries 
with a civil code that expressly contemplates the recovery of damages for non-pecuniary 
damages occasioned by breach of a contract.187
Although the possibility of recovering such kind of damages had developed from 
several French positive provisions, doctrinal opinions and jurisprudential resolutions, the 
1825 Code introduced at that time new features (now common in all states) that included 
provisions that in the early Nineteenth Century could be invoked only in equity courts;188 
and even when the French Code was silent on this matter, the 1825 Code in art.1928 (3) 
was very explicit.189
It has been assured that art. 1928 has no exact equivalent in the French Code and 
its sources cannot be readily ascertained. Although, it is possible to trace the sources in a 
passage of the work of Toullier who: emphatically supported the view that the breach of 
a promise of marriage should give rise to damages, in spite of the difficulty that might be 
encountered in assessing them, a view he expounded against the strong current of 
opinion to the contrary that prevailed at the time.190 He also maintains that, as to know 
                                                 
186 W. T. Tête, Tort Roots and Ramifications of the Obligations Revision, 32 Loy. L. Rev. 47, 102 (1986). 
187 Id. supra note 129, at § 6.11.  
188 Id. supra note 68, at 174. 
189 Id. supra note 173, at §180.  
190 3 Toullier, Le droit civil français 429-440 (1833) cited by Id. supra note 129, at § 6.22. 
 50
whether damages for non-pecuniary loss could be recovered, a general principle should 
be considered: failure to perform any obligation to do gives rise to damages, and a 
promise of marriage entails an obligation to do, damages are then owed for the non-
fulfillment of such a promise.191 Hence, what was required to grant damages was a failure 
to perform an obligation, and the expectation that the un-rendered performance was 
supposed to fulfill did not matter.192  
As closing words for this Chapter, it is worth mentioning that the solution 
propounded in art.1928 was doubtful during the Nineteenth Century, but finally was 
admitted by modern law due to bringing contractual responsibility closer to the matter of 
civil liability at large. This final remark demonstrates the foresight of the redactors of the 
1825 Code, 193  a fact that will be developed in the Third Part of this presentation, but that 
was interesting to introduce at this point.  
                                                 
191 Id. supra note 139, at 9. 
192 Id. supra note 139, at 9. 
193 Carbonnier, Droit Civil 509 (1957) cited by Id. supra note 173, at §180. 
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Chapter VII 
The French Presence in Civil Codification 
 
 
 Throughout different sections of this presentation we have made reference to the 
French Code and the tremendous influence that it had, together with the French culture, 
in the codification process La. undertook in the Nineteenth Century. 
In addition, the French influence did not finish with the enactment of the Digest, 
the 1825 Code, or the 1870 Code. That influence survived, not only due to the existence 
of French versions of the codes,194 but also due to the need of legal interpretations that 
would help understand the adopted provisions. 
Therefore, attention must be focused to the French influence and heritage, without 
ignoring non-pecuniary interest which are a center point to this Second Part. 
 
1. A Civil Code Not Limited to the Empire (1804) 
 
Even if the following paragraphs do not refer especially to non-pecuniary 
damages, they offer solid grounding about the French Code. Such foundation, together 
with the Historical Background provided in the First Part, could help readers understand 
some reasons why the French influence was established in the civil law systems during 
the mid Nineteenth Century.  
 
                                                 
194 Except for the 1870 Code that was exclusively drafter in English. 
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a. The Path to a Code in France  
 
In France, during the late Eighteenth Century and early Nineteenth Century, a 
feeling of general dissatisfaction existed with regards to the resolutions of the Superior 
Courts and the extent of diversity local customs reflected. Hence, in 1791, the 
revolutionary Constituent Assembly resolved there was a need of a civil code for the 
territory. In 1793, the National Convention created a special commission led by 
Cambaceres, who drafted a project of 719 articles. The project was rejected by the 
National Convention who alleged that the project was by far too technical and too 
detailed. Notwithstanding, Napoleon showed interest in the project (with the amendments 
it had been subject to); finally, in 1804, the different titles of the project became 
consolidated as a code under the name Code Civil des Français. Later, in 1807, the name 
would be changed to Code Napoleon.195
The French Code was the product of a rational legislation that reflected distinctive 
ideological premises and formal qualities. Amongst the main positive characteristics of 
the French Code, it is possible to mention that it: (i) contained few and brief definitions; 
(ii) was free of prejudices and based on sublimated common sense; (iii) had a claim to 
universality, completeness, and logical drafting; (iv) had different areas of law 
systematically196 arranged and had inner consistence; and in brief (v) logic ruled 
throughout the entire French Code.197  
                                                 
195 Id. supra note 111, at 42. 
196 According Id. supra note 111, at 44: The 2,281 articles of the code are systematically arranged in a 
preliminary title dealing with the law and its application in general, and in three “books” dealing with the 
law of persons, the law of things and methods of acquiring rights. The first book of the code deals with the 
enjoyment of civil rights, the protection of personality, domicile, guardianship, tutorship, relations of 
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When drafting the French Code, the main redactors (i.e. Portalis, Tronchet, 
Maleville and Bigot Preameneu)198 relied on the drafts of earlier commissions and on the 
doctrinal contributions of Pothier and Domat. 199 In addition, they eliminated all Spanish 
law influences that could abrogate for feudal, theocratic, or monarchical features. For 
example, the French Code was one of the first Codes to eliminate any reference to kings 
or monarchs and that implemented the separation of powers described by 
Montesquieu.200 Professor Yianopoulos is very clear when he explains why such 
eliminations were decided: codification in France preceded the revolution. 201
Both the French Code and the 1825 Code were aimed at the owner of property 
and not the peasant or day laborer. Both bodies of law also enhanced the responsible 
paterfamilias who was believed to have judgment and knowledge of business affairs and 
law. The growing bourgeoisie of both territories depended on safeguarding private 
property and personal freedom. Consent has been achieved by saying that freedom to 
interact in economic activities was the most important of all those personal freedoms. In 
                                                                                                                                                 
parents and children, marriage, personal relations of spouses and the dissolution of marriage by 
annulment or divorce. The second book of the code regulates property rights: ownership, usufruct, and 
servitudes.[…] The third book of the code deals with the methods of acquiring rights by succession, 
donation, marriage settlement, and obligations. In the last chapter the code regulates a number of 
nominate contracts, legal and conventional mortgages, limitation of actins and prescription of rights. In the 
field of successions, freedom of disposition is limited in favor of surviving children and by public policy 
considerations relating to the prohibition of fideicommissa. With regard to obligations, the law establishes 
the traditional Roman law categories of contracts, quasi contracts, offenses and quasi offenses. The law of 
contracts reflects, in general, a highly individualistic spirit. 
197 Id. supra note 111, at 43. 
198 ABELARDO LEVAGGI, 1 MANUAL DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ARGENTINO  191 (1986). 
199 Id. supra note 111, at 44. 
200 Id. supra note 125, at 1100. 
201 Id. supra note 111, at 42. 
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brief, there were three ideological pillars: (i) freedom of contract (e.g. provided a new 
conception of autonomy for parties when contracting); (ii) private ownership of property 
(e.g. stated a new system of ownership that was complete, free, and almost an absolute 
right); and (iii) family solidarity (e.g. it allowed greater liberty of marriage and 
divorce).202
From those pillars, other important issues developed: (i) all citizens were equal 
before the law; (ii) primogeniture, hereditary nobility and class privileges were 
extinguished; (iii) civilian institutions were emancipated from ecclesiastical control; (iv) 
people were free to contract; and (v) private property was protected by inviolability.203
 
 b. The Difficulty of Finding Geographical Limits for the Code  
 
 During the early years of the Nineteenth Century, the French Code followed the 
armies of Napoleon and was, therefore, introduced into Belgium, Luxemburg, German 
territories on the left bank of the Rhine, the Palatinate, Rhenish Prussia, Hesse-
Darmstadt, Geneva, Savoy, the duchies of Parma and Piacenza, Piedmont, the 
principality of Monaco, Italy, the Netherlands, the Hanseatic territories and the grand 
duchy of Berg. 204  
                                                 
202 Id. supra note 73, at 31. 
203 Id. supra note 111, at 44. 
204 Id. supra note 111, at 45. 
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Different was the manner in which the French Code entered into Westphalia, 
Hanover, the grand duchy of Warsaw, several Swiss cantons and in the Illyrian provinces. 
In those territories, the French Code was adopted through direct persuasion.205
Other European territories voluntarily adopted, either by simple translation or 
with considerable modifications, the French Code after the expansionist military 
campaigns of France had finished: Sicilies (1819), Parma (1820), Modena (1852), 
Sardinia (1837), Italy (-in whole- after its unification in 1865), Netherlands (1838), the 
Ionian Republic (1842), Rumania (1864), Portugal (1867) and Spain (1889).206
The expansion of the French Code was not limited to Europe. In America the 
code also served as inspiration source in Canada (civil code of Quebec of 1866), Haiti 
(1825), Dominican Republic (1884), Bolivia (1830), Chile (1855), Ecuador (1857), 
Columbia (1873), Uruguay (1868) and Argentina (1869).207
Last but not least, and adding to this interesting survey Egypt (codes of 1875 and 
1883), Lebanon (1834) and Japan (draft of code applied from 1880 to 1896 without 
legislative approval)208 also received significant influence from the French Code. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
205 Id. supra note 111, at 45. 
206 Id. supra note 111, at 45. 
207 Id. supra note 111, at 46. 
208 Id. supra note 111, at 46. 
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2. Original French Text for Art.1928 
 
 It has been mentioned previously that both the Digest and the 1825 Code were 
drawn originally in French and translated to English209 and that the quality of the 
translation into English Language has been field of study for scholars.  
The promulgation of the 1825 Code did not instruct any specific provision for the 
solution of differences or ambiguities when working with the translations. Due to the fact 
that the original was drafted in French, and the existing believe that the English 
translation was of poor quality, the French version was accepted as the controlling text.210
The original writing of art.1928 of the 1825 Code was not free of problems of 
translation. Therefore, it is necessary to provide the reader a transcription of art.1928 in 
its original French version. 
 The entire text of art.1928 in the French original version reads: 
Art. 1928 –Lorsque l’Object du contrat consiste dans toute autre chose 
que le payement d’une somme d’argent, les dommages dus au créancier 
pour la violation du contrat, sont de la perte qu’il a faite, ou du gain dont 
il a été privé, sauf les exceptions et les modifications ci-après: 
1. Lorsque le débiteur n’a été coupable d’aucune fraude ou mouvais foi, il 
n’est sujet qu’aux dommages que les parties ont eu ou peuvent 
raisonnablement être supposées avoir eu en vue, au temps du contrat. La 
mauvaise foi, dont il est question dans cet article et le suivant, ne s’entend 
pas d’une simple violation de promesse qui résulterait de l’inexécution du 
contrat, mais d’une violation faite a dessein, et d’âpres quelque motif 
d’intérêt ou de mauvaise volonté; 
2. Quand l’inexécution du contrat est le résultat de la fraude ou de la 
mauvaise foi, le débiteur est sujet, non seulement a tous les dommages qui 
ont été ou pu être prévus a l’époque ou le contrat a été fait, mais encore a 
ceux qui sont la conséquence immédiate et directe de la violation du 
contrat; néanmoins, même dans le cas de fraude, ces dommages ne 
peuvent excéder ceux dont il est fait mention dans cet article; 
                                                 
209 Id. supra note 74, at 12. 
210 Id. supra note 74, at 12. 
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3. Quoique la règle générale soit que les dommages doivent être de la 
perte que le créancier a éprouvée, et du gain dont il a été privé, il est des 
cas où des dommages peuvent être accordés, sans les calculer en aucune 
manière sur la perte pécuniaire, ou la privation du gain que la partie 
peut avoir éprouvée. Lorsque le contrat a pour but de procurer a 
quelqu’un une jouissance purement intellectuelle, telle que celles qui 
tiennent a la religion, a la morale, au goût, a la commodité ou a toute 
autre espèce de satisfaction de ce genre, quoique ces choses n’aient pas 
été appréciées en argent par les parties, des dommages n’en seront pas 
moins dus pour la violation de la convention. Un contrat, qui a pour but 
une fondation religieuse ou charitable, une promesse de mariage, ou 
l’entreprise de quelqu’ouvrage appartenant aux beaux arts, offre 
l’exemple d’un cas auquel cette règle peut s’appliquer. 
Les dommages, qui doivent être accordées d’après cette règle, et dans les 
cas de délits, quasi-délits, quasi-contrats, sont laissés en grande partie a 
la prudence du juge ou du jury pour leur fixation ; mais dans les autres 
cas, le juge ni le jury n’ont aucune discrétion a exercer, et ils doivent 
accorder les dommages-intérêts, qui, d’après les dispositions 
précédentes, peuvent dédommager le créancier de la violation du 
contrat, lorsqu’elle a été la suite de la faute, de la négligence, de la 
fraude, ou de la mauvaise foi du débiteur; 
4. Si le créancier est coupable de quelque mauvaise foi, qui retarde ou 
empêche l’exécution du contrat, ou si, a l’époque où il a été passé, le 
créancier avait connaissance de quelques faits, qui devaient empêcher ou 
retarder l’exécution, et les a caches au débiteur, il n’aura droit a aucuns 
dommages; 
5. Lorsque les parties, au temps du contrat, ont fixé la somme qui serait 
payée comme dommage, pour sa violation, le créancier peut exiger cette 
somme, mais n’a pas droit a davantage. Néanmoins, si le contrat est 
exécuté en partie, les dommages dont les contractants sont convenus, 
peuvent être réduits a la perte qui a été réellement soufferte, et au gain 
dont la partie a été privée, a moins qu’il n’ait été expressément stipulé que 
la somme fixée par le contrat serait payée même dans le cas d’une 
violation partielle.211
 
The article under study is located in Section 4 Des dommages qui résultant de 
l’Inexécution des Obligations, Chapitre 3 De l’effet des obligations, Titre 4 Des 
Obligations Conventionnelles, Livre III Des Différentes Manières dont s’acquière la 
Propriété des Biens.  
                                                 
211 Id. supra note 43, at 627. 
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Although the Section that follows allows the reader to study in detail the problems 
that the differences between the French and English versions of art.1928 have created in 
the legal application of that provision, it is worth mentioning at this point that the English 
version for Section 4 of the article reads: Inexecution after the French Inexécution. In the 
French version Inexécution could be interpreted as non-fulfillment or non-compliance 
with an obligation.  
 
3. Struggles between French and English Versions  
 
Currently, many La. court decisions make reference to the French text of the 
Digest and the 1825 Code to make accurate interpretations and applications of the 
existing law. 212 That is so, because scholarly opinions mention that a number of errors 
crept-in with the translation into English of the text of the 1825 Code that was originally 
drafted in French.213 Hence, although the corpus of the French language has long since 
disintegrated, its spiritus continues to haunt La. law.214
The following subsections will identify, in art.1928 of the 1825 Code, any 
deficiencies of translation from the French original text and will provide some alternative 
ways to solve those problems. More emphasis will be added to those defects that have a 
particular relation with non-pecuniary damages. 
 
 
                                                 
212 Id. supra note 10, at 1307.  
213 Id. supra note 111, at 63. 
214 Id. supra note 10, at 1307.  
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a. Object or Cause  
 
The first defect of translation that is worth mentioning is the one that relates to the 
object or cause of the contract as being an intellectual enjoyment. The codifiers when 
drafting in the French language had applied the French word but in art.1928 (3). Later, 
when translating for the English version, the word but was turned into the English word 
object.  
A view of the French text provides a clearer understanding. In the original it is 
stated that: …Lorsque le contrat a pour but de procurer a quelqu’un une jouissance 
purement intellectuelle…215   
On the other hand the English translation is: …Where the contract has for its 
object the gratification of some intellectual enjoyment…216
The word but, if properly translated from the French, should have turned into end, 
purpose, or even motive; these, terms are similar to the ones used to define cause.217 
Unfortunately, and due to a misinterpretation of the French, art.1928 (3) refers to the  
object of the contract as being of intellectual enjoyment. Therefore, courts in La. tried to 
transform, by interpretation, the word object into cause218 when pursuing non-pecuniary 
                                                 
215 Id. supra note 43, at 627. 
216 Id. supra note 43, at 626. 
217 Kathryn Bloomfield, Recovering Non pecuniary Damages for Breach of Contract under Louisianan 
Law, 47 La. L. Rev. 541, 552 (1987). 
218 Riche v. Wrestview Mobile Homes, Inc., 375 So. 2d 133, cited by Id. supra note 217, at 552. 
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damage recovery or even other words that are nearer to the understanding of cause219 
(e.g. purpose,220 reason,221 and motivating factor222).  
 
b. Spectrum of the Intellectual Enjoyment  
 
Another interesting discussion between the French and English versions has been 
raised when analyzing art.1928 (3). Another section of that provision of the 1825 Code in 
its English version reads: …gratification of some intellectual enjoyment, whether in 
religion, morality, or taste, or some convenience or other legal gratification…223  
The referred passage has been subject to three different interpretations due to its 
ambiguity: (i) that the language should be interpreted in an exegetic way, and therefore 
the object of the contract should be exclusively intellectual enjoyment, as opposed to 
partially intellectual and partially physical gratification; (ii) that a wider understanding 
should be applied, and therefore, if any part of the object is intellectual enjoyment, then 
damages could be recovered, although the object also contained physical elements; and 
(iii) that a more liberal interpretation should be applied, and hence, no requirement of 
intellectual elements is needed, other than that the object of the contract provides some 
physical benefit not appreciable in money. 224
                                                 
219 Id. supra note 217, at 552. 
220 Schroeder v. Di Pascal Cabinet Co., 467 So. 2d 1380; Smith v. Andrepont, 378 So. 2d 479; Plaisance v. 
Dutton, 336 So. 2d 1034, cited by Id. supra note 217, at 552. 
221 Robertson v. Jimmy Walker Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 368 So. 2d 747, cited by Id. supra note 217, at 
552. 
222 Ostrowe v. Darensbourg, 369 So. 2d 1156-58,  cited by Id. supra note 217, at 552. 
223 Id. supra note 43, at 626. 
224 Id. supra note 132, at 1161. 
 61
While the broad interpretation (i.e. that any intellectual gratification will suffice) 
has been advocated by the alleged source of inspiration of the article (i.e. Domat) and the 
liberal interpretation is preferred due to policy considerations, the French version of 
art.1928 (3) seems to indicate that an exegetic interpretation would be the most 
appropriate. 225
The French original text reads: …Lorsque le contrat a pour but de procurer a 
quelqu’un une jouissance purement intellectuelle, telle que celles qui tiennent a la 
religion, a la morale, au goût, a la commodité ou a toute autre espèce de satisfaction de 
ce genre…226
On the other hand the English translation, for the same section, reads: …Where 
the contract has for its object the gratification of some intellectual enjoyment, whether in 
religion, morality, or taste, or some convenience or other legal gratification…227   
Scholarly contributions have proposed the following translation as being more 
accurate: …When the contract has for its object to confer to someone a purely 
intellectual enjoyment, such as those pertaining to religion, morality, taste, convenience 
or other gratifications of this sort…228  
This last interpretation requires the object of the contract to be exclusively 
intellectual and bans any elements of physical gratification.  
In addition, the French text contains no or before taste so that convenience is not a 
second kind of contractual object, but merely one of the category of purely intellectual 
                                                 
225 Id. supra note 132, at 1173. 
226 Id. supra note 43, at 627. 
227 Id. supra note 43, at 626. 
228 Id. supra note 132, at 1174. 
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enjoyments covered by the 1825 Code. Hence, recovery for breach of a contract that 
provides purely physical convenience is not granted by the text of the 1825 Code.229
Another significant deficiency in the translation which directly relates to 
intellectual enjoyment is that the redactors included the adverb purely between 
intellectual and enjoyment. 
As it has been mentioned supra, the original French text reads: … une jouissance 
purement intellectuelle…,230 while the English translation says that: … some intellectual 
enjoyment…231 Therefore, according to the defective translation, exclusivity of purpose 
was not included in the text of the law.  
In addition to the description made in the previous paragraphs, if La. courts 
followed the English text, they would have not been able to read art.1928 (3) finding the 
exclusivity of the purpose.232 On the other hand, if the French text was considered by La. 
courts when ruling, damages for breach could have been recovered even when the 
contract had for its object the satisfaction of an exclusively non-pecuniary interest.233  
 
c. The Calculating Method  
 
Argumentation related to the results of the translation from the French text, 
appear a third time throughout art.1928 (3). In this opportunity a comment must be done 
regarding the translation of en aucune manière from the French version. 
                                                 
229 Id. supra note 132, at 1174. 
230 Id. supra note 43, at 627. 
231 Id. supra note 43, at 626. 
232 Id. supra note 129, at § 6.23. 
233 Id. supra note 129, at § 6.23.  
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 The article under study, in its original French text, provides that: …sans les 
calculer en aucune manière sur la perte pécuniaire…234
On the other hand, the English version of the year 1825, understood that an 
accurate and peaceful translation would be…without calculating altogether on the 
pecuniary loss, or the privation of pecuniary gain to the party…235
A scholarly contribution has stated that an accurate translation would be: 
…without calculating in any manner on the pecuniary loss, or the privation of pecuniary 
gain to the party…236  
In that way a more faithful translation would be achieved and potential problems 
of complaints in court could be avoided, if parties intend to trace the spirit of the 
provision back to its French roots.  
 
 
d. Those and not This 
 
Even when it exceeds the scope of this presentation, it is interesting to mention 
that paragraph 2 of art.1928 of the 1825 Code shows a defect in the translation when it 
reads:  …but even when there is fraud, the damages cannot exceed this…237
                                                 
234 Id. supra note 43, at 627. 
235 Id. supra note 43, at 626. 
236 WEST’S LOUISIANA STATUTES ANNOTATED, 16 CIVIL CODE 1105 (1972) 
237 Id. supra note 43, at 626. 
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The French version reads in the pertinent section: ….néanmoins, même dans le 
cas de fraude, ces dommages ne peuvent excéder ceux dont il est fait mention dans cet 
article…238
Therefore, it has been noticed that the English translation should read, in order to 
provide a faithful reflection of the original idea, as follows: …those which are mentioned 
in this article.239
 
e. A Not not Included in the French Provision  
 
The last paragraph of art.1928, i.e. paragraph 5, reflects another problem in the 
translation of the French text when transformed into the English legal tool. 
The French version of the referred paragraph mentions that: ...néanmoins, si le 
contrat est exécuté en partie, les dommages dont les contractants sont convenus…240
On the other hand the English translation provides that: …but when the contract 
is not executed in part, the damages agreed on by the parties may…241
It is therefore possible to notice that the original French version of art.1928 in its 
paragraph 5 did not provide a counterpart for the word not that is found in the English 
version of the same paragraph and article.  
                                                 
238 Id. supra note 43, at 627. 
239 Id. supra note 236, at 1105. 
240 Id. supra note 43, at 627. 
241 Id. supra note 43, at 626. 
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This last defect of translation could possibly be attributed to a material error at the 
moment of adapting the French text into an English version that would be a handy tool 
for those professionals of law that did not speak the French language. 
According to all the abovementioned references, it seems quite clear that the 
English and French versions of art.1928 of the 1825 Code show differences in their texts. 
Such differences are the result of a deficient work of translation. In addition, the referred 
differences made the recovery for non-pecuniary loss unclear,242 and therefore, made 
uncertain the results of the presentations filed before the La. courts when pursuing claims 
in that area of law. 
  
 
                                                 
242 Id. supra note 129, at § 6.23.  
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Chapter VIII  
Case Law Reporting in Antebellum Louisiana 
 
 
 This Third Part is probably the main contribution of this presentation to the area 
of study. It will focus the attention of the reader to the application courts have done of the 
non-pecuniary damages doctrine. In addition, it will describe some influences the 1825 
Code, in its art.1928, had on other codification projects, both in La. and abroad. 
 Initially, it is necessary to mention that in order to achieve a clear understanding 
of the legal research of case law in La., it is mandatory to read and use the skills Wallach 
and Downer Pritchett provide in their significant contributions.243 These texts turned to 
be a starting point that any research enterprise must face before undertaking the hard task 
of pursuing positive results. 
 
1. Electronic and Hardcopy Materials 
 
Before the mid-Twentieth century, the process involved for creating collections 
and identifying legal materials pertinent to antebellum La. was complex. 244 Until the 
creation of the main electronic legal databases,245 i.e. Westlaw, LexisNexis and Loislaw, 
                                                 
243 Vide KATE WALLACH, RESEARCH IN LOUISIANA LAW (1960) and Carla Downer Pritchett, Case Law 
Reporters in nineteenth CenturyLouisiana, A LAW UNTO ITSELF? 61(2001). 
244 David A. Combe, An Analysis of Civil Law. Authorities in State v. Martin, LOUISIANA MICROCOSM 
OF A MIXED JURISDICTION 295, 295 (1999) 
245 In addition, the La. Supreme Court created a website that allows the search of court decisions as from 
1996 (http://www.lasc.org/opinion_search.asp). 
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research of case law in La. had to be done on hardcopy materials, and the availability of 
reporters was limited. Facing such an activity seemed an enormous challenge, especially 
as time kept moving and separating the reporters from the date of their printing.  
In the last two decades, the electronic legal databases turned to be an extremely 
useful tool for more recent legal research. By 1999, the databases of Westlaw and 
LexisNexis were limited in their scope of research due to the fact they only included La. 
Supreme Court cases as from 1887; and cases from the Appellate Courts as from 1928 in 
Westlaw and 1944 in LexisNexis.246 In present days, both databases have achieved the 
satisfactory goal of including all the reporters in an electronic support,247 while Loislaw 
only covers as from 1921. As a result of that goal, the research has not only turned 
accessible from every part of the world, but is also much more expeditious.  
The use of these electronic devices as tools has lightened the work of researchers. 
Notwithstanding, a knowledge of the hard copy materials is mandatory, and therefore, 
this presentation will turn the focus to such task.   
 
2. The Starting Point (Martin’s Collections)  
 
François Xavier Martin, who had been appointed justice of the court in 1810, 
published the first La. Supreme Court reports. This series is referred to as Martin’s Old 
Series and covers the period 1809-1823 in 12 volumes. In older judicial cases, this series 
is sometimes referred as Martin, and not O.S. (which is the most used way). 248 A second 
                                                 
246 Id. supra note 43, at 295. 
247 MORRIS L. COHEN AND KENT C. OLSON, LEGAL RESEARCH IN A NUTSHELL -8TH EDITION- 389 (2003). 
248 Id. supra note 76, at 75. 
 69
series, i.e. Martin’s New Series, covers in 8 volumes the period 1823-1830. This series is 
sometimes simply referred to as N.S. 249 Martin suffered from weak eyesight from birth, 
and thus, his diminished vision and heavy workloads forced him to give up case reporting 
in 1830.250
Martin had began to collect copies of the decisions and briefs of cases before the 
court, and in 1811, he published the first volume of his reporters, covering cases from 
1809-1811. He lamented the absence of reported decisions in La. and mentioned the 
obstacles to his plans to publish them.251 Therefore, he described the difficulties faced by 
local judges with the Spanish and French legal systems, and the limitations that were 
created by deficient translations due to the unknown different legal systems. In addition, 
Martin case reports included head notes and arguments of counsel. 252
Martin published the reporters with his personal funds and in his spare time, 
therefore, the volumes were understandably slow to appear:  by 1817, 3 volumes; by 
1822, 9 volumes; and by 1827, the number of volumes had gone up to 17.253
 
3. The Legacy Continues (First Louisiana Reports) 
 
                                                 
249 Id. supra note 76, at 75. 
250 Carla Downer Pritchett, Case Law Reporters in nineteenth CenturyLouisiana, A LAW UNTO ITSELF? 
61, 61 (2001). 
251 Thomas Tucker, Interpretations of the Louisiana Civil Codes, 1808-1840: The Failure of the 
Preliminary Title, 19 Tul. Eur. & Civ. Rev. 57, 159 (2004). 
252 Id. supra note 76, at 75. 
253 Id. supra note 251, at 160. 
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 Having Martin abandoned his arduous task, a new period for reporting started in 
La. in 1830. The 2nd Sess., 9th Legis., p. 24 provided an Act by which the La. Legislature 
ordered the publication of Supreme Court reports under the name of La. Reports.254
 The La. Legislature also specified the requirements that should be included when 
reporting cases: i) brief and clear statements of facts, ii) points made by counsel and 
authorities cited in support of them, iii) court’s opinion, and iv) lucid marginal notes and 
copious index to each volume.255
 The La. Reports were published by Branch Miller (reporting volumes 1-5) and 
Thomas Curry (reporting volumes 6-19).256 As it has been mentioned before, the La. 
Reports started to be published in 1830 and were interrupted in 1841.257
 The name La. Reports was going to be used again from the year 1900 until 
present days, but it is worth mentioning that this was the first period in which it was used. 
 
4. Reporting for 5 Years (Robinson Reporters) 
 
 In 1841, Merritt M. Robinson and E. Johns & Company of New Orleans were 
awarded the contract and published the La. Supreme Court decisions.258 The reporters 
that resulted from their works are known as the Robinson Reporters or Rob. The 
designation was done by an Act of 1841, 15the Legis., 2d Sess, N 175, p. 526, which 
                                                 
254 Id. supra note 76, at 75. 
255 Id. supra note 76, at 75. 
256 Id. supra note 76, at 75. 
257 WIN-SHIN S. CHIANG, LOUISIANA LEGAL RESEARCH 87 (1990) 
258 Id. supra note 257, at 87. 
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made reference to the concession for the publishing of the case reports of the La. 
Supreme Court.259  
 A short notice must be provided with respect to the fact that interesting 
observations on case reporting for the period are included in the preface to the first 
volume of the Robinson Reporters.260  
 The duties of Robinson were terminated in the year 1846, and a total of 12 
volumes resulted from his works.261
 
5. In an Annual Basis (Louisiana Annual Reports) 
 
 In 1846, the La. Legislature repealed the 1841 Act with a new act262 and 
prescribed that each volume should cover a full year and be entitled La. Annual Reports 
or La. Ann.263
 The new series was published in 52 volumes, covering the years 1846 to 1900,264 
by far this series was the one that covered more years till that moment. 
 Finally, it is worth mentioning that volumes 20, 45, 46, 48, 49 and 52 of the La. 
Annual Reports are printed in two parts.  
 
 
                                                 
259 Id. supra note 76, at 75. 
260 Id. supra note 76, at 75. 
261 Id. supra note 76, at 75. 
262 Vide La. Legislature Acts 1846, N 114, p.89 
263 Id. supra note 76, at 75. 
264 Id. supra note 257, at 87. 
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 6. The Present Days (Second Louisiana Reports and West’s Southern Reporter) 
 
 In 1900, the La. Supreme Court ordered that future reports should be entitled 
again La. Reports. Due to the fact that till the moment a total of 103 volumes had been 
published (including all the previous reporters publishing works), the first volume of the 
new La. Reports started with the number 104. In 1904, the La. Supreme Court awarded 
the contract for printing to West Publishing Company;265 and this under the direction of 
the La. Supreme Court published the La. Reports until 1972.266
 As from 1972, the West’s Southern Reporter, Second Series267 and West’s 
Louisiana have been reporting cases of the La. Supreme Court.268
 
7. Quick-Reference Table 
 
 The following table will provide to the readers a clear recapitulation of what has 
been mentioned in the previous subsections of this Chapter. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
265 Id. supra note 76, at 76 
266 Id. supra note 257, at 87. 
267 The first series of the Southern Reporters started in 1886 and, it has been reporting uninterrupted since 
that date. 
268 Id. supra note 257, at 87. 
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Exclusive  Louisiana Supreme Court Reporters269
Name  Cited Period Total Volumes Numbered 
Martin (Old Series) Mart. (O.S.) 1809-1823 12 1-12 
Martin (New Series) Mart. (N.S.) 1823-1830 8 1-8 
Louisiana Reports La. 1830-1841 19 1-8 
Robinson Rob. 1841-1846 12 1-12 
Louisiana Annual La. Ann. 1846-1900 52 1-52 
Louisiana Reports La. 1900-1972 159 263270
Southern Reporter So. 2d 1972-Present ---- --- 
 
 
                                                 
269 The information for this table was provided by KATE WALLACH, RESEARCH IN LOUISIANA LAW (1960) 
and WIN-SHIN S. CHIANG, LOUISIANA LEGAL RESEARCH (1990). 
270 Since prior reports from 1 Mart. (O.S.), to 52 La. Ann. Totaled 103, numbering of La. Reports begins 
with 104. 
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Chapter IX 
Reception by the Judicial Courts 
 
 
 This Chapter will focus the analysis of the readers to the results of the research, 
done on the case reporters in La., during the period of years 1825-1870.271 In addition, a 
brief reference to the French jurisprudence will be included as to enrich the perspective of 
the readers. 
 
1. Louisiana Jurisprudence (1825-1870) 
 
 Amongst the results of the research needed for this presentation, it was possible to 
find several cases that referred to art.1928 of the 1825 Code. The following paragraphs 
provide a display that will surely help readers to appreciate and understand the results of 
this presentation.   
In order to fulfill a clear disposition of information, the presentation will initially 
address the cases that were found on hard copy (i.e. the reporters themselves and general 
indexes) and then the ones provided by electronic databases (i.e. Westlaw and 
LexisNexis). The search was done limited to the cases that mentioned art.1928 in a broad 
manner (i.e. any of its five paragraphs), thus, once the general cases were found, a deeper 
analysis was done in order to determine if the reference were exclusively to art.1928 (3). 
                                                 
271 The research necessary for this presentation was done with the support of the electronic databases of 
Westlaw and LexisNexis, together with hardcopy materials found in the LSU Law Center Library. 
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If the cases referred specifically to art.1928 (3), a brief comment and analysis was 
provided. 
 
2. Hard Copy Indexes 
 
The search on hard copy was done mostly with the assistance of two important 
indexes272 published in La. before the existence of electronic databases. The first index 
dates back to the mid-Nineteenth Century and the second to the early Twentieth Century.     
 
a. Mid-Nineteenth Century (Deslix Index) 
 
The first index, i.e. Deslix Index, provides that, reaching the mid-century, 
art.1928 had been mentioned in 14 cases 273 before the La. Supreme Court. From that 
total amount, only 2 cases refer specifically to art.1928 (3), while the other 12 cases refer 
to the remaining paragraphs of art.1928.274  
                                                 
272  P. J. A. DESLIX, ANNOTATIONS ON THE LOUISIANA CODES OR THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT 
GENERAL INDEX AND DIGEST FROM 1809 TO FEBRUARY 1843 85 (1847) and THEODORE ROEHL, 
ANNOTATIONS TO THE STATUTE LAW OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA  106 (1917). 
273 Id. supra note 172, at 85.  
274 The complete list of cases that refer to art.1928 in a broad manner consists of:  Jones et al. v. Smalley, 5 
La. 28; George v. Mc. Neil et al., 7 La. 124; Clark et al. v. Giffard et al., 7 La. 524; Morris v. Abat et al., 9 
La. 552; Durrive et al. v. Frera, 11 La. 374; Noe v. Taylor, 11 La. 551; Guice v. Harvey, 14 La. 198; 
Municipality No2 v. Hennen, 14 La. 559; Welch & Co. v. Thorn et al., 16 La. 188; McMaster and another 
v. Brandr and others, 2 (Rob.) La. 498; Lobdell v. Parker, 3 La. 328; Porter v. Curry et al., 7 La. 233.  
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In October 1839, the La. Supreme Court provided the first decision in the Miller 
v. Holstein275 case and referred specifically to art.1928 (3) of the 1825 Code. 
That case was an action of slander in which Miller claimed that on June 30, 1837, 
Holstein had a view to defame and injure his character and good name, and destroy his 
reputation.276 In addition, Miller also said that at other times, Holstein had maliciously, 
falsely, and wickedly charge him, with being “a rascal, and having sworn falsely,” 
alleging at the same time, “that he had the documents to show for it.”277 Therefore, 
Miller claimed from Holstein $5,000 in damages for those unprovoked, malicious, 
slanderous and false charges.278
The court said that arts.2294 and 1928 (3) of the 1825 Code sustained Miller’s 
pretensions, and according to the provisions of the law, granted a judgment in favor of 
Miller.279
 Regarding art.1928 (3), the court said that: 
there is proof that the plaintiff had, since his residence in this 
neighborhood, “always supported a good character, and been an 
industrious honest man.” Though this might not suffice for a show of 
special damage in the sense of the common law rule, yet it is difficult to 
come to the conclusion that there was no damage shown. If there be any 
intellectual enjoyment higher than that of possessing a good name, or 
gratification greater than the respect of our neighbors, they must be 
looked for in matters out of the reach of the libeller: such a charge as is 
stated in the petition, is in itself presumption of damage; in this view, the 
law has left the damages to the jury, subject to the revision of this court.  
 
                                                 
275 Miller v. Holstein, 16 La. 389. 
276 Id. supra note 275, at  389. 
277 Id. supra note 275, at  389. 
278 Id. supra note 275, at  389. 
279 Id. supra note 275, at  389. 
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The great importance of the principles involved in the case allowed a re-hearing 
and re-argument of Miller v. Holstein,280 one year later.281 In that second opportunity, the 
La. Supreme Court provided the same result, although it gave additional arguments to 
explain its decision. Amongst those arguments it is possible to find references to other 
court decisions that are not under the scope of art.1928 (3), and therefore, were not 
included in the Deslix Index.  
One of those cases, dated in 1831, i.e. Cauchoix v. Dupuy,282 granted damages 
when the plaintiff was called a colored man. According to the court, the words used 
would not provide a possibility of action in themselves by any English or American 
authority referred to, though under our construction of art.1928 [(3)], that judgment was 
correct; this is supported by analogy to those common law decisions, which make 
actionable the charge of some contagious disease, which would have the effect of 
excluding a man from society.283 Therefore, even though, the moral disease of perjury 
might produce the same effect, the charge of it is not actionable.284
Another resolution that the La. Supreme Court cited was Carlin v. Stewart.285 In 
that case Stewart had called Carlin a perjured villain.286 In that opportunity, the court 
said that a professional man may not be able to administer positive or direct evidence of 
his injury.287 Therefore, the court concluded that the alleged injurious words would not 
                                                 
280 Id. supra note 275, at  389. 
281 The re-hearing was reported as Miller v. Holstein, 16 La. 395. 
282 Cauchoix v. Dupuy, 3 La. 206. 
283 Miller v. Holstein, 16 La. 395. 
284 Id. supra note 283, at 395. 
285 Carlin v. Stewart, 2 La. 73. 
286 Id. supra note 285, at 73. 
287 Id. supra note 283, at 395. 
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be held actionable. In order to expand its ideas, the court mentioned that at that time, it 
would have been much more difficult for a female, to furnish positive or direct testimony 
of her injury, or to value it in dollars and cents.288 Concluding, the La. Supreme Court 
said that by common law rule, [they] must hold these words not actionable, though every 
intellectual enjoyment may be destroyed for life.289
It could be said that according to the complete discussion of the La. Supreme 
Court, the moral damages that Miller had suffered allowed him to pursue a recovery of 
damages under the provisions of art.1928 (3) of the 1825 Code.290
Ultimately, with the Miller cases, the La. Supreme Court addressed for the first 
time the complicated interpretation of art.1928 (3).291  
                                                 
288 Id. supra note 283, at 395. 
289 Id. supra note 283, at 395. 
290 Readers will surely find of interest the following concluding section of Miller v. Holstein, 16 La. 395: 
After the adoption of the Louisiana Code, and the repeal by the legislature of the ancient laws, there were 
not a few lawyers who doubted whether in such actions as slander, and some others sounding in damages, 
it was not necessary to prove the damages before a party could recover, but the better and more general 
opinion now prevails, that under the articles 2294, 2295 and 1928, they can be maintained. If that is 
correct, and the action of this court, the general assent of legal men, and my own convictions induce me to 
believe it is, we have a law broad enough to cover every case. “Every act whatever of man that causes 
damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.” There is no arbitrary standard 
prescribed. Every act that causes damage, creates responsibility. To a technical lawyer, this may seem very 
indefinite, but as it is impossible to provide for every case which fraud or malice may devise, we are 
obliged to authorize a discretion in the judicial tribunals, that will apply a remedy for every wrong. In 
actions of slander, I am not an advocate for establishing any particular standard by which words are to be 
judged as being actionable or not actionable. I am willing to leave every case to be decided on its merits 
and peculiar circumstances, under the broad principles laid down in the [1825] Code, which are very 
similar to the laws in force previous to its adoption. Partidas 3, tit. 2, 1.31. But, if any such standard is to 
be adopted, I object most strongly to that established by the common law, that no words are actionable, 
and subject a party to damages without special proof, but such as impute an indictable offence, or injure a 
man in his profession. I believe an action of slander can be, and ought sometimes to be maintained, for 
words which do not charge an offence that will subject the party to indictment. 
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 b. Early Twentieth Century (Roehl Index) 
 
The second index includes 19 cases that mention art.1928 between the years 1825 
and 1870. It is worth mentioning that these 19 cases are different to those provided by the 
first index.292
From the 19 cases that include a reference to art.1928, 7 cases make a reference 
exclusively to art.1928 (3), while the remaining 12 cases293 focus on other paragraphs of 
art.1928.  
Finally, from those 7 cases that mention exclusively art.1928 (3), a new division 
will be done when analyzing those that focus on the first paragraph and those that focus 
on the second paragraph of art.1928 (3). This division will help readers to achieve a clear 
understanding. 
 
i. Non-Pecuniary Damages. First Paragraph of art.1928 (3) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
291 The results of this presentation show the Miller cases were the first cases in which art.1928 (3) was 
subject to the La. Supreme Court analysis. 
292 THEODORE ROEHL, ANNOTATIONS TO THE STATUTE LAW OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 106 (1917). 
293 Barclay v. Conrad, 7 La. 261; Williams v. Barton, 13 La. 404; Kernan v. Chamberlin, 5 (Rob.) La. 116; 
Porter v. Barrow, 3 La. Ann. 140; Stewart v. Sowles, 3 La. Ann. 464; Hutchinson v. Sparks, 3 La. Ann. 
548; Gaulden v. McPhaul, 4 La. Ann. 79; Rugely v. Goodloe, 7 La. Ann. 294; Goodloe v. Rodgers, 10 La. 
Ann. 631; Logan v. Hickman, 14 La. Ann. 300 (this case does no reference to art.1928, therefore I must be 
understood that the editor made a material error); Smith v. Thielen,17 La. Ann. 239; Griffin v. His 
Creditors, 6 (Rob.) La. 216. 
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The first case that refers exclusively to the first paragraph of art.1928 (3), in the 
Roehl Index, is Wardens of Church of St. Louis v. Blanc.294 This decision was dated in 
1844, and addressed non-pecuniary damages under art.1928 (3). In this case, the 
petitioners sought that the bishop, Antoine Blanc, be cited to answer their petition, and 
that after due proceedings, a judgment for $25,000 would be rendered in their favor.  
 The Wardens of the church founded their action on the alleged opinions of Blanc 
in relation to the government and discipline of the Catholic Church within the diocese of 
La. They also complained of Blanc’s dereliction of duty towards the corporation they 
represented -of his non- compliance with the obligations which he contracted when he 
consented to become their bishop, and whereby he was bound, amongst other things, to 
grant his institution to the curate presented, unless there should be some obstacle,- modo 
nihil obstet.295 Finally, they sustained that due to their right of patronage, which is a real 
one, belonging to those who build a church, and inherent to the right of ownership, they 
[were] by law entitled to be protected in its exercise. That it is a civil right- verum in jure 
civili jus patronatus, […] and that it can be enforced by the civil tribunals.296
In brief, the Wardens implied the bishop, not only had a contractual duty to 
comply with his obligations, but also had a duty to comply with some obligations that 
gave them intellectual enjoyment in the terms of art.1928 (3).297 Hence, they should be 
                                                 
294 Wardens of Church of St. Louis v. Blanc, 8 (Rob.) La. 51. 
295 Id. supra note 294, at 51. 
296 Id. supra note 294, at 51. 
297 In words of the court: The plaintiffs assume, that the Rev. A. Blanc, in assenting to become bishop of 
New Orleans, undertook towards the Catholic congregation certain obligations, which constitute his part 
of the contract entered into with them. That on their side, they assumed to do and perform certain things, 
and to accomplish certain obligations, which they have done, performed and accomplished;-but that the 
bishop has not only failed to do what he was bound to do, but actually impedes them in the gratification of 
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able to recover those non-pecuniary damages. On the other hand, the bishop defended his 
position by sustaining that art.1928 (3) was not aimed to apply in such situation.298  
The judge of the Parish court rendered an opinion in favor of Blanc and dismissed 
the petition,299 and thus, the plaintiffs appealed. Ultimately, on appeal, the La. Supreme 
court affirmed the decision of the Parish court giving its own arguments.300
                                                                                                                                                 
their dearest intellectual enjoyment, to wit, that of having the ceremonies of their religion and public 
worship performed; in consequence of all which, they suffer damages to the amount claimed. According to 
Id. supra note 294, at 51. 
298 In words of the court: But the defendant insists, that this is not a question of which the civil tribunals can 
take cognizance. It must be admitted, that wherever there is a contract, there are obligations created, the 
non-performance of which gives necessarily rise to the adverse right of claiming indemnification therefor. 
That it was in the contemplation of the authors of our Code to apply those principles to cases like the 
present one, cannot be seriously contested. Art. 1928, § 3, of the Civil Code, provides,” that where the 
contract has for its object the gratification of some intellectual enjoyment, whether in religion, morality or 
taste, or some convenience or other legal gratification, although these are not appreciated in money by the 
parties, yet damages are due for their breach. A contract for a religious or charitable foundation, a 
promise of marriage, or an engagement for a work of some of the fine arts, are objects and examples of this 
rule.”[…] The duty of the bishop to institute the curate appointed is asserted by the plaintiffs: the assertion 
remains uncontradicted, and under the pleadings must be taken for granted.[..] If the bishop be bound to 
discharge this duty, and we have succeeded in showing that it was an obligation contemplated by the law, 
then the exception is disposed of. According to Id. supra note 294, at 51. 
299 The judge said: the curate forms a separate and integral portion of the corporation, and that, during a 
vacancy in that office, the corporation cannot act. He also sustained the exceptions on the ground, that no 
action for damages, founded on the refusal of the bishop to give his ecclesiastical sanction to the 
nomination of a curate made by the wardens, or to nominate one himself, could be maintained, it being, in 
fact, an action against the bishop to recover damages for his disagreement with the wardens, in regard to a 
matter of doctrine or church discipline. According to Id. supra note 294, at 51. 
300 The court said: It follows, we think incontestably, from what has been said, that the relation which exists 
between the bishop and the plaintiffs, according to their own allegations, implies no civil contract, and 
consequently given rise to no civil obligations. It is not aleged, that any such contract exists. On the 
contrary they allege, that his salary has been withdrawn and suppressed, because the wardens had 
overstepped their power in allowing it, and because the bishop never preached, as required to do by the 
canons and laws of the church. We look, therefore, in vain, for any contract between the parties insisted on 
by one of the counsel for the plaintiffs in his printed brief, having for its object the gratification of some 
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The second case is Black v. Carrollton Railroad301of the year 1855. In that case, 
the son of the plaintiff, a boy of fourteen years, was a passenger in the trains of the 
defendants. The accident was caused by the switch being out of place, and thus, being left 
partly open, the cars were thrown off the track, and the son suffered injuries in his body. 
Those injuries occasioned great expense and mental suffering to his father. The father 
alleged that due to the injuries, he lost time, [was under] mental suffering, [felt] 
disappointment of his paternal hopes, with regard to the future of his child and the 
comfort and aid he expected to derive from his society and the fulfil[l]ment of his filial 
obligations.302
In Black, the court said that the jury had the authority to determine the extent of 
the recovery.303 The decision also mentioned that such extend should have some kind of 
                                                                                                                                                 
intellectual enjoyment, whether in religion, morality, or taste, or some convenience or other legal 
gratification spoken of in article 1928 of the Louisiana Code. On the contrary, the bishop is quite 
independent of the church wardens, except in relation to his spiritual or sacerdotal functions.[…] The 
wardens administer the temporalities of the church, and may give or withhold salaries at their pleasure; 
and as they cannot compel the bishop to institute a curate of their appointment, so neither can he compel 
them to pay one whom he may have appointed or approved. No one pretends that the bishop has a right to 
interfere in the administration of the temporalities of the church, and to appropriate to himself, or his 
subordinates, any part of the revenues of the corporation. The curate according to the charter, has a 
deliberative vote in those matters, as one of the wardens. It is true, it is the duty of the wardens to apply the 
revenues, in part, to provide in a suitable manner for public worship. But they are responsible only to their 
constituents, for the manner in which they perform that trust; and although they are authorized to make any 
appropriate contract for that purpose, it does not follow that they can compel any one to contract with 
them, or that the bishop of New Orleans is in any legal sense, subordinate to the wardens of one of the 
churches within his diocese, in relation to his clerical functions. According to Id. supra note 294, at 51. 
301 Black v Carrollton Railroad, 10 La. Ann. 33. 
302 Id. supra note 301, at 33. 
303 The judicial resolution stated that decisions of juries, in situations as the one referred in Black, provided 
a salutary dread, for the reason that their discretion in awarding damages is not limited by any precise 
rules, and this is calculated to secure vigilance, care and circumspection among those who have the 
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comprehensive limit,304 in words of the court, sound discretion. Thus, the La. Supreme 
Court ordered to reduce the verdict in the case. 
It has been said that due to the outcome in Black, the La. Supreme Court had 
narrowed the scope of non-pecuniary damages when refusing to allow recovery of mental 
anguish suffered by a plaintiff, as a result of an injury or damage suffered by another 
person.305 It is important to mention that, even when in this case the father could not 
recover for mental anguish, the court recognized that in La. non-pecuniary damages were 
contemplated in art.1928 (3).  
The third case, i.e. Morgan v. Yarborough,306 is an action for breach of promise of 
marriage decided in the year 1850, in which the La. Supreme Court stated that under art. 
1928 (3) a reciprocal promises of marriage constituted a legal contract, and therefore, the 
party violating it was liable in damages. 
In 1844, Stephen Yarborough promised to marry Maria Morgan. That promise 
was accepted by Morgan, who proceeded to New Orleans and made arrangements for the 
wedding. Later, Yarborough broke his promise to marry Morgan, by marrying another 
lady.  
                                                                                                                                                 
management of railroads, steam vessels and other public conveyances, which would not exist without it. 
According to Id. supra note 301, at 33. 
304 The damages in such cases not being susceptible of exact computation are nevertheless assessed 
according to the sound discretion of the Judge or Jury, and if there are circumstances of aggravation in 
cases of offences or of gross negligence in cases of quasi-offences, it is quite proper in assessing the 
damages to adopt the rule […] of blending together the interests of society and of the aggrieved individual 
and allowing such damages as would save to prevent the repetition of such conduct. According to Id. supra 
note 301, at 33. 
305 Id. supra note 183, at 111.  
306 Morgan v. Yarborough, 5 La. Ann. 316. 
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Morgan claimed $20,000 in damages for the breach of promise of marriage, and 
the jury found a verdict for $1,000 in her favor. Thus, Yarborough appealed the decision 
of the court and alleged that every marriage contract must be made in writing, before a 
notary public and two witnesses, and recorded. 
The court understood that promise to marry is one thing, and a marriage contract 
is another. According to the facts, the court said Yarborough and Morgan had entered 
into a promise to marry. In addition, the court said that art.1928 (3) refers exclusively to 
promise to marry, and that the promise to marry need not be in writing before a notary 
and two witnesses.  
Ultimately, the court concluded that Morgan should recover damages because the 
promise to marry was contemplated in art.1928 (3).307
 
ii. Jury Discretion. Second Paragraph of art.1928 (3) 
 
The first case is McGary v. City of Lafayette.308 This case was decided in 1849, 
and refers exclusively to the second paragraph of art.1928 (3), i.e. the jury decision. 
                                                 
307 The following passage will be of interest for the readers: in conclusion, we may take occasion to 
observe, that this is the first time we or our predecessors have been called upon to consider an action of 
this kind. It is a fact creditable to our people; and we hope that such actions may not become frequent. 
While we are bound, under our jurisprudence and code, to recognise the right of action, we are 
constrained to say that a female of refined sensibility could scarcely bring herself to such a suit; and that 
the appeals which are usually made to juries in such cases, on the score of the wounded affections of the 
woman, can have little foundation in truth. Such suits are not unfrequently the mere instruments of 
extortion; courts and juries should, therefore, cautiously restrict relief to cases of real injustice. According 
to Id. supra note 306, at 316. 
308 McGary v. City of Lafayette, 4 La. Ann. 440. 
 85
In the referred case, after the verdicts of two juries309 in favor of McGary, 
damages were measured in accordance to art.1928 (3).310 Notwithstanding, the La. 
Supreme Court understood that some limits may be applied to the amount of damages311 
and reversed the decision imposing a diminution in the recovery.  
The second case is Chataigne v. Bergeron,312 and also refers to the second 
paragraph of 1928 (3). The decision was rendered by the La. Supreme Court in 1855.  
The facts show that both parties, having quarreled, casually met one night. At that 
moment, Bergeron’s gun was discharged and Chataigne was injured. Bergeron claimed 
                                                 
309 On the first trial in the District Court, the plaintiff obtained a verdict for $10,000 damages, upon which 
judgment was rendered in her favor. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment; but, on an application for 
a re-hearing, the majority of the court remanded the case for a new trial, principally on the ground that the 
damages were excessive. The court also intimated a doubt as to the liability of the corporation for the 
tortious acts charged against its officers. On the second trial the plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment 
for $5,000 and the defendants prosecuted the present appeal. According to Id. supra note 308, at 440. 
310 The reparation made must equal the injury inflicted. But an exception is made by art. 1928 C. C., in 
relation to damages resulting from offences, quasi-offences, and quasi-contracts. In those cases, says the 
Code, much discretion must be left to the judge or jury […] This disposition of law while it gives to the 
judge or jury a discretion which they have not in other actions of damages, clearly intimates that the 
discretion thus given is not illimited, and in this respect our jurisprudence differs from that of the english 
courts, upon whose authority the plaintiff's counsel relies. According to Id. supra note 308, at 440. 
311 Admitting that the verdicts of juries in those cases should not be disturbed on slight grounds, and that 
they ought to be maintained, although their amount is something larger than we approve, yet there is a 
limit beyond which it is our duty to interfere, and we think this a proper case for our interference. The 
defendants were entitled to the land they claim. The plaintiff being aware of that fact, had abandoned it for 
the public use, and put up a building on the last line given by the city surveyor. He is not entitled to be 
indemnified for the value of this land, and it is proved that the damage sustained by the taking down of the 
wall could not have exceeded three or four hundred dollars. We admit that the actual loss sustained is not 
the measure of damage, and that the jury had a right to take into consideration the violent and illegal 
proceedings of the officers of the corporation. The facts of the case would, in our opinion, have authorized 
a verdict for $1500, and we will decree accordingly. According to Id. supra note 308, at 440. 
312 Chataigne v. Bergeron, 10 La. Ann. 699. 
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that his gun went off accidentally as he stooped to pick up a stick. Upon the trial by a 
jury, a verdict was rendered in favor of Chataigne for $1,000, thus, Bergeron appealed. 
The La. Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision, and said that according 
to the facts, the jury did not err in their assessment of damages. Also, the court said that 
in cases similar to the one at bar, much discretion in the assessment of damages, is left to 
the jury [art.1928 (3) 1825 Code].313
The third case under analysis is Frank v. New Orleans & C.R. Co.,314 it dates 
back to 1868. Frank brought suit to recover damages of the Rail Road Company for 
injuries suffered by himself, his sons, his daughter, and his wife, from the culpable 
conduct of its servants.315  Defendant alleged that Frank had no legal standing to recover 
damages for the death of his family members.  
                                                 
313 Id. supra note 312, at 699. 
314 Frank v. New Orleans & C.R. Co., 20 La. Ann. 25. 
315 He claimed that they all: were passengers in a car belonging to defendant; that while the car was at 
rest, at the usual stopping place, under charge of defendant's servants, an express train of cars belonging 
to defendant, and under charge of its servants, came down the track on which rested the car in which he 
and his family were, with dangerous speed, and that before they could escape from the car in which they 
were, the express train was hurled against it with irresistible momentum; that by the collision his son, 
Dennis, was miserably crushed to death; his son, Henry, his daughter, Caroline, and his wife, Mary, were 
severely injured, and that they were for a length of time under surgical and medical treatment. He further 
alleged, that although he escaped without any injury, yet, that his life was in great danger, and that from 
alarm and terror, he suffered great damages; that in consequence of the destruction of the life of his son, 
Dennis, and of the protracted illness and suffering of his wife and his children, Henry and Caroline, he was 
put to great expense, and suffered great pecuniary loss and damage, and that his wife and each of his said 
children, by their injuries, also suffered great damage. He alleged, finally, that the wrongs, injuries, 
sufferings and damage of himself, his wife and his children, as above set forth, were caused entirely by the 
gross negligence, want of skill, imprudence, illegal conduct, and recklessness of the New Orleans and 
Carrollton Railroad Company, its officers and servants, and damaged him and them to the extent of 
$30,000, and he concluded his petition by praying for judgment against defendant for that amount. 
According to Id. supra note 314, at 25. 
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Notwithstanding, a jury verdict resulted in favor of Frank for $5,000 due to 
damages suffered. On appeal before the La. Supreme Court, the same decision was made. 
The reporter mentions that: in cases of death of the minor children, through the 
carelessness of another, the right of action shall survive in favor of the surviving father. 
In order to bring a case within that statute, the plaintiff should allege the cause of action 
in, and the damages suffered by, the deceased child.316
Referring to art.1928 (3) it may be added that the La. Supreme Court said that in 
cases of this kind, where no exact computation of damage can be made, discretion is left 
to the judge or jury.317
The last case in this subsection is Varillat v. New Orleans & C.R. Co.,318 of the 
year 1855. This case shares the same defendant as the previous case, and also refers to the 
second paragraph of art.1928 (3). The plaintiff, Varillat, filed suit in order to recover 
damages for the injuries she sustained while being a passenger on defendant’s cars. The 
injuries resulted from a collision between the horse and the steam cars.  
The lower court had instructed the jury that no vindictive damages could be 
granted if it was revealed that no willful fault on the part of the company existed.319 In 
                                                 
316 Id. supra note 314, at 25. 
317 Id. supra note 314, at 25. 
318 Varillat v. New Orleans & C.R. Co., 10 La. Ann. 88. 
319 In words of the court: The Judge of the Court below, at the request of defendant's counsel, charged the 
jury, that if they believed from the evidence there was no wilful fault on the part of the company or its 
officers, they could not give vindictive damages. He was then requested to charge the jury “that, under 
such circumstances, the jury cannot give damages with the view to punish the defendant, or to make an 
example, but are only to consider and assess the damages sustained by the plaintiff; that charge the Judge 
refused to give, but charged the jury, that if they believed there was gross neglect or carelessness, or want 
of skill on the part of the servants of the company, then it was for them to assess the damages for such an 
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this case, Varillat obtained a verdict and judgment for $1,000. The Rail Road Company 
appealed, and the La. Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision.320
In brief, the La. Supreme Court said it is proper to charge to find any amount as 
damages which the circumstances of the case justify, if the employees of the company 
were guilty of negligence, in view of Code, art. 1928, giving the jury “much discretion” 
in assessing damages in such cases.321
 
3. Electronic Databases 
 
Present day research has a very valuable tool that by far allows the results to be 
obtained more expeditiously, that useful tool is the electronic database. Westlaw and 
LexisNexis are publishing companies that have very important electronic databases.  
At this point, it is necessary to mention that the results of the research on the 
electronic databases provided a list of 29 cases that were not included in any of the hard 
copy indexes. On the other hand, the electronic databases did not include, when searching 
                                                                                                                                                 
amount, as they might deem the circumstances of the case justified. The defendants took a bill of 
exceptions. According to Id. supra note 318, at 88. 
320 In words of the court: The Louisiana Code, Art. 1928, provides, that in the assessment of damages in 
actions of this nature, much discretion must be left to the jury; and Article 516 of the Code of Practice 
declares, that the Judge in charging the jury, must limit himself to giving the jury a knowledge of the laws 
applicable to the cause submitted to them, and that he should abstain from saying anything about the facts, 
or even recapitulating them, so as to exercise any influence on their decision in that respect. However 
anomolous it may be to forbid the Judge to charge the jury on the facts when he has the power, and it is 
even his duty to set aside their verdict, if contrary to his opinion, yet such is the law. In the case recently 
decided of Black v. Carrollton Railroad Company, we have considered these articles as authorizing a 
judgment for vindictive damages in actions of this nature, when the circumstances of the case warrant it. 
According to Id. supra note 318, at 88. 
321 Id. supra note 318, at 88. 
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for references to art.1928, some cases that the hard copy indexes did includ.322 This 
shows that even while faster, not all the electronic searches are totally effective. 
 From the 29 cases that the electronic databases provided, a total of 12 cases refer 
to art.1928 (3), more specifically, the second paragraph of art.1928 (3); while 17 cases323  
refer to the remaining paragraphs of art.1928.  
 The first case that refers to art.1928 (3) is Pike v. Doyle,324 of the year 1867. This 
case refers exclusively to paragraph 2 of the art.1928 (3). The plaintiffs, claimed that they 
had been damaged by Doyle, who had counterfeited their brand in selling whisky.  
The lower court, following a jury verdict, rendered judgment against Doyle. Thus, 
the last appealed, and finally, the La. Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision.  
The exact extent of damage done by defendants was not possible to measure with 
the evidence. Notwithstanding, the La. Supreme Court said that, in cases like Pike, the 
law left discretion in the Judge or jury to assess damages, without proof of their exact 
                                                 
322 The cases that did not appear after the search in the electronic databases are: Chataigne v. Bergeron, 10 
La. Ann. 699; Clark et al. v. Giffard et al., 7 La. 524; Durrive et al. v. Frera, 11 La. 374; Frank v. New 
Orleans & C.R. Co., 20 La. Ann. 25; Gaulden v. McPhaul, 4 La. Ann. 79; Guice v. Harvey, 14 La. 
198; Jones et al. v. Smalley, 5 La. 28; Logan v. Hickman, 14 La. Ann. 300; McMaster and another v. 
Brandr and others, 2 (Rob.) La. 498; Miller v. Holstein, 16 La. 389; Noe v. Taylor, 11 La. 551; Smith v. 
Thielen,17 La. Ann. 239; Stewart v. Sowles, 3 La. Ann. 464; Welch & Co. v. Thorn et al., 16 La. 188; 
Williams v. Barton, 13 La. 404 
323 The cases are: City of New Orleans v. Wire, 20 La. Ann. 500; Mallerich v. Mertz, 19 La.Ann. 194; 
Gauthier v. Green, 14 La.Ann. 788; Feray v. Foote, 12 La. Ann. 894; Corning v. Elliott, 10 La. Ann. 753; 
Cronan v. Peters, 9 La. Ann. 468; Burrows v. Peirce, 6 La. Ann. 297; Le Duff v. Porche, 5 La. Ann. 148; 
Murphy v. Diamond, 3 La. Ann. 441; Ryder v. Thayer, 3 La. Ann. 149 ; Smith v. Berwick,12 (Rob.) La. 20; 
Byrne v. Union Bank, 9 (Rob.) La. 433; Vallette v. Patten, 9 (Rob.) La. 367; Brown v. Pontchartrain R. Co., 
8 (Rob.) La. 45; Longpre v. White, 6 La. 388; Reading v. Donovan, 6 La. Ann. 491, Goodloe v. Rogers, 9 
La. Ann. 273. (This last case appeared in the hard copy materials -vide supra footnote 293- with a different 
name for the defendant and in a different reporters, but with the same facts). 
324 Pike v. Doyle, 19 La. Ann. 362. 
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amount.325 In other words, where facing quasi offences and having no proof of the 
damage suffered, an assessment thereof will be within the discretion of the jury. 
 The second case to be analyzed is Rayne v. Taylor,326 of the year 1866, and also 
refers to the second paragraph of the article under study. Rayne had filed a claim due to 
libel against Taylor.  
The lower court ruled in favor of plaintiff, and hence, defendant appealed. The 
La. Supreme Court affirmed the decision.   
In brief, and using words of the La. Supreme Court, according to art.1928 (3), in 
the assessment of damages in cases of offenses, quasi offenses, and quasi contracts much 
discretion must be left to the court or jury, a verdict of $7,500 in a libel suit in which 
defendant pleaded justification which he failed to sustain was not so excessive as to 
justify its vacation on appeal.327
 The third case is Grant v. McDonogh.328 This case, decided in 1852, states that 
Grant’s plantation was overflowed by the failure of McDonogh to keep the levee in front 
of his land in repair. Grant said, he therefore, could not recover the amount he would 
have received from his crops, if he had been able to plant them and erect buildings 
necessary to manufacture the cane into sugar. 
                                                 
325 Id. supra note 324, at 362. 
326 Rayne v. Taylor, 18 La. Ann. 26. 
327 Id. supra note 326, at 26. 
328 Grant v. McDonogh, 7 La. Ann. 447. 
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The case was tried before a jury, who found for the Grant in the amount of 
$21,960, hence, the executors of McDonogh appealed. Ultimately, the La. Supreme Court 
reversed the case and said that not more than $5,000 should be granted to the plaintiff.329
In few words, the court said that though the jury are not restricted to a bare 
indemnification for the injury actually proved from the defendant's gross negligence, yet, 
under their legal discretion, the exemplary should bear some proportion to the real 
damage sustained.330
 The fourth case is Brown v. Crockett,331 and was reported in 1853. In this case, 
Brown, in his capacity of testamentary guardian of Mary McNeil, a minor, sued for the 
benefit of his ward. She sought  for damages for a wrongful abduction of her person, and 
various personal wrongs suffered by her at the hands of Crockett.  
The jury, under their discretion, gave a verdict against Crockett in solido for 
$5,000, and from a judgment rendered thereon, Crockett appealed. The La. Supreme 
Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. 
The La. Supreme Court said that in an action for the abduction of a minor, mental 
pain inflicted on the minor, may be considered by the Jury.332 The court also said that in 
                                                 
329 The court said: It is true, the jury were not restricted to the allowance of such damages as would merely 
indemnify the plaintiff for the injury actually proved, but we think, that under the discretion vested in them 
by the third paragraph of article 1928 of the code, the exemplary damages allowed should bear some 
proportion to the real damage sustained, and that the verdict should not have exceeded $5000; to this 
amount the judgment must therefore be reduced. According to Id. supra note 328, at  447. 
330 Id. supra note 328, at  447. 
331 Brown v. Crockett, 8 La. Ann. 30. 
332 In words of the court: In the next place, the jury had clearly a right to consider the mental pain inflicted 
upon the child, a legitimate subject of amend. See Civil Code, Art. 1928. In doing so, “much discretion 
must be left to the jury,” ib.; and the exercise of this discretion a court will not disturb on light grounds, 
but will restrict its control to cases of manifest excess. We have no reason to consider the verdict in this 
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doing so they have much discretion, the exercise of which a court will not disturb on light 
grounds, restricting its control to cases of manifest excess.333
The fifth case, decided in 1853, is Gould v. Gardner.334 This case is an action for 
damages for a malicious arrest in a civil suit.  
A jury gave a verdict in favor of Gould, and thereafter a judgment against 
Gardner for $8,900 was ordered, thus, the defendant filled for appeal. The La. Supreme 
Court reversed the decision of the lower court. 
 This case is worth mentioning because, even when the facts focus the reader to 
another area of law (i.e. malicious arrest), the La. Supreme Court stated, throughout its 
decision, that the jury were the exclusive judges when determine the amount of 
damages.335  
The sixth case is Wilcox v. Leake,336 and was decided in the year 1856 by the La. 
Supreme Court. Wilcox claimed the recovery of $119, for medical and surgical services 
alleged to have been rendered by him to Leake. On the other hand, when responding, 
Leake claimed reconvention for $2,500 in damages due to the fact that Wilcox, as a 
physician and surgeon, inflicted upon him serious and unnecessary injuries by his neglect 
and want of skill in performing the services for which he was called. 
                                                                                                                                                 
case passionate or capricious; on the contrary, when the aggravated circumstances of the wrongs 
complained of are considered, it seems to us that the jury used their power with moderation. According to 
Id. supra note 331, at 30. 
333 Id. supra note 331, at 30. 
334 Gould v. Gardner, 8 La.Ann. 11. 
335 In words of the court: Of the amount of damage the Jury are the exclusive judges, and the damages are 
not confined to mere monied loss. Civil Code, Art. 1928. According to Id. supra note 334, at 11. 
336 Wilcox v. Leake, 11 La. Ann. 178. 
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A jury gave a verdict in favor of Wilcox, awarding him $72 and rejecting the 
reconvention. Thus, Leake appealed, and finally, the La. Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision. 
 When referring to the amount of damages to be granted, the La. Supreme Court 
said that it was the exclusive discretion of the jury, and not of the witnesses, to determine 
such amount.337 In other words, an action for medical services in which defendant sets up 
that the plaintiff had inflicted on him serious injuries from want of skill, it was not 
permissible for a witness for defendant to give his opinion as to the amount of damage 
suffered.338
 A brief mention will be done to the seventh case, i.e King v. Ballard.339 This case 
of the year 1855, says that in actions of slander, when pursuing damages, the discretion 
given to the jury may not be unlimited.340  
                                                 
337 In words of the court: It was for the jury, and not the witness, to determine, from all the circumstances 
disclosed by the evidence, whether the plaintiff had occasioned any damage to the defendant by his 
negligence or want of skill; and if so, to assess the amount of such damage. It is the peculiar province of a 
jury to make the assessment of damages in such cases, in which much discretion is vested in them, under 
the rule prescribed in the third paragraph of Article 1928 of the Civil Code. Were it otherwise, the 
witnesses, and not the jury, would be the judges to determine the matter. According to Id. supra note 336, 
at 178. 
338 Id. supra note 336, at 178. 
339 King v. Ballard, 10 La. Ann. 557. 
340 The court said: Without examining the evidence in detail, we deem it sufficient to say, that we are all 
fully satisfied with the verdict so far as it settles the fact of malice against the defendant, but we are of 
opinion that considering all the facts of the case, the damages allowed are excessive. Whatever may be the 
rule of the common law on the subject of damages in actions of slander, we consider it settled that under 
the textual provision of Article 1928 of the Code, the discretion given to the jury in actions of that kind is 
never unlimited, and that although their verdict should not be disturbed on slight grounds, there are limits 
beyond which the law makes it our duty to interfere. According to Id. supra note 339, at 557. 
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 The eighth case, i.e. Arrowsmith v. Gordon,341 also deserves a brief mention. In 
this case of 1848, the La. Supreme Court stated that the discretion of the jury finds a limit 
when only allowing the recovery of damages that were or might have been foreseen at the 
time of making the contract, together with the damages that resulted from the immediate 
and direct consequence of the breach of the contract.342  
The ninth case is Franklin v. Alexander,343 and was reported in 1830 with unclear 
facts. The case is founded in the execution of a note given on a settlement between the 
parties for the balance due for the purchase of 8 slaves by Alexander from Franklin.  
The reporter mentions, without too much of an explanation, that the jury are the 
legitimate judges of the quantum of damages, in assessing which the law leaves them 
much discretion […] Their verdict will be generally sustained, unless excessive or 
unsupported by the evidence, when the case will be remanded.344
Bourguignon v. Boudousquie345 is the tenth case, and was decided in 1831. The 
claim originally was done to establish the boundary of contiguous tracts of land, claimed 
by the parties. Bourguignon obtained a judgment by which she gained about 13 arpens 
and then prosecuted to recover the fruits and revenues of the land which she was 
adjudged, for the period it was possessed by Boudousquie.  
                                                 
341 Arrowsmith v. Gordon, 3 La. Ann. 105. 
342 In words of the court: Our own law provides that when the inexecution of the contract has proceeded 
from fraud or bad faith, the debtor shall not only be liable to such damages as were or might have been 
foreseen at the time of making the contract, but also to such as are the immediate and direct consequence 
of the breach of the contract. But even when there is fraud the damages cannot exceed this, and no 
discretion is left to the judge or jury. C. C. art. 1928, §2, 3. According to Id. supra note 341, at 105. 
343 Franklin v. Alexander, 2 La. 76. 
344 Id. supra note 343, at 76. 
345 Bourguignon v. Boudousquie, 2 La. 393. 
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The claim for damages was then submitted to a jury who estimated the damages 
and gave a verdict for $919, thus, Boudousquie appealed. The La. Supreme Court 
reversed the case stating that the amount of damages had been excessive.346
In this opportunity, the reporter makes exactly the same commentary as in the 
previous case.347 In brief, the reporter says that the jury has a limit in its discretion that 
may be found in the evidence resulting from the case. 
The eleventh case is Terrill v. Chambers,348 and was decided in 1838 by the La. 
Supreme Court. In this case, Terrill said he was the owner of a tract of land that was 
invaded by Chambers, without any right or title whatever. He also said that Chambers 
had interrupted the labor of Terrill’s slaves. Terrill said his damages were of $5,000. On 
the other hand, Chambers denied, said he was the owner of the land in question, prayed 
for the establishment of the boundary line, and reconvened for $5,000 in damages for the 
illegal detention and cultivation of the land Terrill did during 3 years. 
The jury found a verdict in favor of Terrill for $1,600. Therefore, Chambers 
appealed. Finally, the La. Supreme Court remanded the case because it found that the 
damages granted to Terrill, according to the facts and evidence, were excessive.349
                                                 
346 In words of the court: The damages assessed by the jury appear to us so enormous, so illy supported by 
the testimony of the cause, that we feel ourselves compelled to reverse the judgment of the court below. 
According to Id. supra note 345, at 393. 
347 In words of the reporter: The jury are the legitimate judges of the quantum of damages, in assessing 
which the law leaves them much discretion. LSA-C.C. art. 1928, No. 3. Their verdict will be generally 
sustained, unless excessive or unsupported by the evidence, when the case will be remanded. According to 
Id. supra note 345, at 393. 
348 Terrill v. Chambers, 12 La. 582. 
349 In words of the court: By interrupting the labor of plaintiff's slaves, for only fifteen minutes, we think the 
injury too trifling to be a subject of serious complaint; and although we would disturb the verdict of a jury, 
assessing damages with great reluctance, yet where such damages are excessive, and altogether 
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The last case is Fredwost v. Daily350 of the year 1841. This case is an action for 
assault and battery, claiming damages. Daily was intoxicated, riotous and noisy in the 
coffee-house where Fredwost was playing dominos. Daily, without provocation, knocked 
down and kicked Fredwost’s wife and beat him.  
The jury arrived to verdict in the amount of $500 for Fredwost, and therefore, the 
lower court made a judgment in favor of Fredwost in the same amount. Daily appealed 
the decision of the lower court.  Finally, the La. Supreme Court affirmed the decision 
because they found no evidentiary reason to reverse it. 
The reporter said the jury were the legitimate judges of the quantum of damages, 
and that the verdicts would be generally sustained, unless excessive or unsupported by 
the evidence. In this case, such exception was not to be applied because the evidence did 
not show that the amount was erred.  
 
4. French Jurisprudence  
 
A brief comment on the French Jurisprudence for non-pecuniary damages may 
provide some interesting background for the readers. To consider and compare this 
information when studying La. court decisions will surely provide a richer and broader 
understanding for the readers.  
                                                                                                                                                 
unsupported by testimony, as in the case now before us, it becomes our duty to set it aside and remand the 
cause to be tried de novo. According to Id. supra note 348, at 582. 
350 Fredwost v. Daily, 18 La. 535. 
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It has been said that in the French jurisprudence some decisions rejected recovery 
outright when the damages sought by a plaintiff were for a non-pecuniary loss. 351  Two 
different cases, that are contemporary to the period of time under study in this 
presentation, provide clear examples. 
A decision dated in 1844 ordered recovery for non-pecuniary loss when a banker 
refused to honor a bill of exchange although the amount of the bill was covered by funds 
of the drawer in the banker’s possession. 352   
Later, in 1873, a less moderate approach of the courts mentioned that a depositary 
that had failed to return a family portrait to its owner had to pay for the intrinsic value of 
the painting, but not for the loss of the sentimental value that the painting had for the 
depositor. 353   
Finally, it has been also said, after some French court opinions, that: later 
decisions have granted protection to contractual interest of an exclusively non-pecuniary  
nature.354  
                                                 
351 Id. supra note 129, at § 6.8.  
352 Decision rendered by the court of the City of Rouen on May 27, 1844, reported in S.44.2.550, cited by 
Id. supra note 129, at § 6.8. 
353 Decision rendered by the Court of the City of Paris on March 27, 1873, reported in in D.P. 74.2.129, 
S.74.1.477, cited by Id. supra note 129, at § 6.8. 
354 Id. supra note 129, at § 6.8. 
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Chapter X 
Influence in Further Codification Projects 
 
 
 Last, but certainly not least, this presentation will focus the attention of the 
readers towards some of the influences art.1928 of the 1825 Code generated in 
codification projects, both in La. and beyond the state limits.  
The references to influences will be limited to mentions and will be far from 
complete. The sole purpose is to show the reader that the text of art.1928 had an 
importance that did not find a frontier in the year 1870. 
 With that objective in mind, the following sections will focus the attention to La., 
the United States as a whole, Europe and Latin America. 
 
1. Louisiana (1870 Code and 1984 Revision) 
 
 When looking into La. legal history, as it has been mentioned in the First Part of 
this presentation, two significant points can be found after the enactment of the 1825 
Code, those are: the 1870 Code and the 1984 Revision. In order to provide a clear 
understanding, the influence the text of art.1928 had on the 1870 Code will be addressed 
first, and it will be followed by the influence in the 1984 Revision. 
 
a. From 1928 to 1934  
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When looking specifically to art.1928, it can be said that when the La. Legislature 
enacted the revision of the 1825 Code in the year 1870, it renumbered art.1928 by giving 
it the number 1934. Also, it has been said that art.1934, of the 1870 Code, was copied 
verbatim from the mistranslated English version of art.1928 of the 1825 Code.355 After a 
detailed reading, this presentation must say that the adoption was not 100% verbatim, and 
that instead, the new code of the year 1870, maintained practically without changes the 
text of the art.1928 when transformed into art.1934.356  
                                                 
355 Id. supra note 132, at 1175.  
356 Art. 1934- Where the object of the contract is any thing but the payment of money, the damages due to 
the creditor for its breach are the amount of the loss he has sustained, and the profit of which he has been 
deprived, under the following exceptions and modifications: 
1. When the debtor has been guilty of no fraud or bad faith, he is liable only for such damages as were 
contemplated, or may reasonably be supposed to have entered into the contemplation of the parties at the 
time of the contract. By bad faith in this and the next rule, is not meant the mere breach of faith in not 
complying with the contract, but a designed breach of it from some motive of interest or ill will. 
2. When the inexecution of the contract has proceeded from fraud or bad faith, the debtor shall not only be 
liable to such damages as were, or might have been foreseen at the time of making the contract, but also to 
such as are the immediate and direct consequences of the breach of that contract; but even when there is 
fraud, the damages cannot exceed this. 
3. Although the general rule is, that damages are the amount of the loss the creditor has sustained, or of the 
gain of which he has been deprived, yet there are cases in which damages may be assessed without 
calculating altogether on the pecuniary loss, or the privation of pecuniary gain to the party. Where the 
contract has for its object the gratification of some intellectual enjoyment, whether in religion, morality 
[“,” missing] or taste, or some convenience or other legal gratification, although these are not appreciated 
in money by the parties, yet damages are due for their breach; a contract for a religious or charitable 
foundation, a promise of marriage, or an engagement for a work of some of the fine arts, are objects and 
examples of this rule. 
In the assessment of damages under this rule, as well as in cases of offences, quasi offences, and quasi 
contracts, much discretion must be left to the judge or jury, while in other cases they have none, but are 
bound to give such damages under the above rules as will fully indemnify the creditor [“s” missing], 
whenever the contract has been broken by the fault, negligence, fraud or bad faith of the debtor. 
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According to the above mentioned, the text of art.1928 was therefore a direct 
source of inspiration for art.1934 of the 1870 Code. This adoption by the La. Legislature 
of the text of art.1928 allowed the provision under study to enter triumphal into the 
Twentieth century. 
As it has been said in the First Part of this presentation, the 1870 Code was only 
promulgated in English language, and therefore, it was not clear what would happen with 
the French versions of the 1825 Code and the Digest. 357   
On the one hand, it has been said that the French versions had no relation to the 
1870 Code and that the 1870 Code was as a piece of legislation complete unto itself. 
Therefore, despite the verbatim reenactment of certain code provisions, the La. 
Legislature intended to change their meaning. 358  
On the other hand, the 1870 Code could have been understood as a continuation 
of the 1825 Code, with the few amendments incorporated by the report of John Ray in 
1869. Hence, the law as contained in an unchanged article was the same after and before 
                                                                                                                                                 
4. If the creditor be guilty of any bad faith, which retards or prevents the execution of the contract, or if, at 
the time of making it, he knew of any facts that must prevent or delay its performance, and concealed them 
from the debtor, he is not entitled to damages. 
5. Where the parties, by their contract, have determined the sum that shall be paid as damages for its 
breach, the creditor must recover that sum, but is not entitled to more. But when the contract is [“not” is 
missing] executed in part, the damages agreed on by the parties may be reduced to the loss really suffered, 
and the gain of which the party has been deprived, unless there has been an express agreement that the 
sum fixed by the contract shall be paid, even on a partial breach of the agreement. According to THE 
REVISED CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA BY AUTHORITY 238 (1870) The main diffeerences 
between the texts of the year 1825 and the year 1870 are: Par.1 and subds. 1-4 same as par.1 and subds. 1-4 
above; but semicolon (;) after “will”, after “exceed this”, after “of the debtor”, and after “to damages”; 
colon (:) after “their breach”; comma (,) after “morality”; “indemnify the creditor” misspelled “indemnify 
the creditors”, after “contract” (not) is missing. 
357 Id. supra note 74, at 12 
358 Id. supra note 74, at 12. 
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the revision of 1870. If facing a discrepancy between the earlier French and English 
provisions, the first would be assumed to be correct.359  
However, the Appellate Courts of La. had a divided interpretation of art.1934 (3), 
some applied it broadly, while others narrowly. Some courts allowed recovery of non-
pecuniary damages if facing objects of the contract that included physical and intellectual 
gratification. The remaining courts stated that the objects of the contract had to 
exclusively include intellectual gratification.360 The reader may notice that prior La. law 
on this subject was obscure.361
Two significant cases should be mentioned at this point. Those cases will help 
understand the evolution of the courts interpretations, and also will try to explain why a 
revision of the text of art.1934 was necessary. 
The first case, i.e. Lewis v. Holmes,362 dated in 1903, mentions that damages for 
humiliation were granted to a bride whose wedding dress had not been tailored 
appropriately. In the same case, the bride was also able to recover for loss of 
entertainment owing to the late delivery of the rest of her trousseau.363
                                                 
359 Id. supra note 74, at 12.  
360 A.L. Barton, Young v. Ford Motor Co.: “Contorts” – Non Pecuniary Damages in Redhibitory Actions, 
67 Tul. L. Rev. 336, 337 (1992).  
361 LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, REVISION OF BOOK III, TITLES III AND IV OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL 
CODE, BOOK III. OF THE DIFFERENT MODES OF ACQUIRING THE OWNERSHIP OF THINGS, TITLE III. 
OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL, TITLE IV. CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS OR CONTRACTS  52 (1983). 
362 Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La. 1030 
363 Id. supra note 361, at 52. 
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In brief, under such disposition, which contemplates financial and spiritual 
damages, the young bride was able to recover damages from the store for the annoyance 
and embarrassment. 364
Approximately after a Centuryof inconsistent and not clear judicial decisions 
related to the area of study,365 the La. Supreme Court decided in Meador v. Toyota of 
Jefferson, Inc.366 That case was filed because following a collision, an eighteen-year-old 
girl brought her first acquired automobile, a 1971 model Toyota, to defendant, Toyota of 
Jefferson, Inc., for repair late in February of 1972. It was returned to her on September 
20, 1972, some seven months later.367 The seven month period shows that there was 
clearly an excessive delay in the repair of the automobile. 
In that same case, the court adopted a broad interpretation of article 1934(3) after 
examining the French and English versions of art.1928 (3). The court concluded that art. 
1934(3) did not exclude non-pecuniary damages simply because the object of the contract 
also included physical gratification.368  In other words, non-pecuniary damages could be 
granted for breach of contracts that had as their principal, though not exclusive, object the 
satisfaction of a non-pecuniary interest. 369  
Courts tried to believe that with this last decision the problem regarding non-
pecuniary damages was going to be settled: history shows this was far from turning into a 
reality. 
                                                 
364 Id. supra note 57, at 44. 
365 SAUL LITVINOFF, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LOUISIANA JURISPRUDENCE. A COURSEBOOK (5th 
Revised Edition 2000) 486 (1978). 
366 Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., et al.,  332 So.2d 433. 
367 Id. supra note 366, at 433. 
368 Id. supra note 360, at 338.  
369 Id. supra note 365, at 486. 
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 b. From 1934 to 1998 
 
Article 1928 of the 1825 Code followed the La. civil law into the Twentieth 
century. The influence was not limited to the 1870 Code; it was able to provide 
grounding for the text of different articles of the New Code, therefore surviving with 
alterations in its words but not in its spirit and essence.  
As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, under the text of the 1870 Code, non-
pecuniary damages for breach of contract was an unsettled issue in the La. courts.  
Although, the La. Supreme Court had tried to announce a controlling interpretation with 
Meador, inconsistencies and uncertainty kept on arising. In addition, new cases involving 
delictual fault challenged more questions and ambiguity.370
Due to this scenario, in 1984, and with the results of the activities of the La. State 
Law Institute, art.1934 was repealed, and the principles of former art.1934 were 
redistributed among arts.1995-2000371 of the New Code.372 The new articles became 
effective on January 1, 1985.373
                                                 
370 Id. supra note 217, at 541.  
371 Art.1995: Damages are measured by the loss sustained by the obligee and the profit of which he has 
been deprived. 
Art.1996: An obligor in good faith is liable only for the damages that were foreseeable at the time the 
contract was made. 
Art.1997: An obligor in bad faith is liable for all the damages, foreseeable or not, that are a direct 
consequence of his failure to perform. 
Art.1999: When damages are insusceptible of precise measurement, much discretion shall be left to the 
court for the reasonable assessment of these damages. 
Art.2000: When the object of the performance is a sum of money, damages for delay in performance are 
measured by the interest on that sum from the time it is due, at the rate agreed by the parties or, in the 
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As a result of the revision on obligations the La. State Law Institution undertook, 
the third paragraph of art.1934, the most relevant for the purposes of this presentation, 
was replaced by art.1998374 in the New Code. The reason for drafting a separate article 
was to provide clarity and precision when applying to concrete situations. In addition, the 
change in the language followed the same objective.375 Also, it has been said that 
art.1998 of the New Code takes a restrictive approach, which is compatible with the main 
continental doctrine which approves recoveries of that kind.376
The text of art.1998 of the New Code eliminates the difficulties that the term 
intellectual enjoyment presented, and thus removes the potential conflicts due to 
interpretation.  In addition, the new text provides an emphasis on the nature of the 
contract that is similar to the causal approach of Meador. Art.1998 retains the distinction 
of Meador between contractual and delictual actions for non-pecuniary damages. The 
new text also promulgates a new distinction between non-pecuniary and pecuniary 
                                                                                                                                                 
absence of agreement, at the rate of legal interest as fixed by R.S. 9:3500. The obligee may recover these 
damages without having to prove any loss, and whatever loss he may have suffered he can recover no 
more. If the parties, by written contract, have expressly agreed that the obligor shall also be liable for the 
obligee's attorney fees in a fixed or determinable amount, the obligee is entitled to that amount as well. 
According to LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE 2005 EDITION VOLUME 437-438 (2005). 
372 Id. supra note 57, at 78.  
373 Id. supra note 131, at 799.  
374 Art.1998: Damages for non-pecuniary loss. Damages for non pecuniary loss may be recovered when the 
contract, because of its nature, is intended to gratify a non-pecuniary interest and, because of the 
circumstances surrounding the formation or the nonperformance of the contract, the obligor knew, or 
should have known, that his failure to perform would cause that kind of loss. Regardless of the nature of the 
contract, these damages may be recovered also when the obligor intended, thorough his failure, to 
aggrieve the feelings of the obligee. According to Id. supra note 371, at 438.  
375 Id. supra note 129, at § 6.21.  
376 Id. supra note 365, at 485. 
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interests.377 Ultimately, refers to non-pecuniary loss rather than non-pecuniary damages, 
providing a distinction more consistent with actual terminology.378  
In words of the drafters, art.1998 of the New Code provides for recovery of 
damages for non-pecuniary loss. Damages for non-pecuniary loss include damages for 
what is known in continental doctrine as “dommage moral”, that is, injury of a moral 
nature in the sense that the injury does not affect a “material” or tangible part of a 
person’s patrimony.379
Even after the enactment of art.1998 of the New Code, some courts feel that the 
rule of Meador can be strictly adhered to or applied more flexibly.380 Thus, even when 
strong textual arguments were provided as to overrule Meador, courts in La. continue 
applying the standards it outlined.381
Therefore, the La. Supreme Court, in Young v. Ford Motor Co., Inc.382 stated that 
according to art.1998 of the New Code, a contract must merely be intended for the 
gratification of a significant non-pecuniary interest of one of the parties in order to allow 
a recover for non-pecuniary damages.383  The debate is not closed with this decision of 
the La. Supreme Court. The end of this argument (if ever possible) is left open, hoping 
that other research activities will work on its developments. 
                                                 
377 Id. supra note 217, at 551. 
378 Id. supra note 129, at § 6.1. 
379 Id. supra note 361, at 51.  
380 Id. supra note 365, at 486. 
381 Id. supra note 131, at 813.  
382 Young v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 595 So.2d 1123 
383 Id. supra note 129, at § 6.29.  
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All the above-mentioned in this section, show the readers that the influence of 
art.1928 (3) of the 1825 Code has not been eliminated with the enactment of art.1998 of 
the New Code, and that it has survived almost 150 years after it was originally drafted.  
 
2. United States 
 
 Unfortunately, the possibility of expanding the results of this presentation into the 
United States was limited. Thus, it is the intention of this presentation to mention, at 
least, the existence of a codification movement in the remaining states of the Union. 
Knowing about that existence, will surely allow future research activities to find possible 
influences of art.1928 of the 1825 Code in such extensive territory. 
The United States was not free from the codification movement that took place 
worldwide during the Nineteenth century. Amongst the states that sought for a codified 
system of civil law it is possible to mention: La.; California; South Carolina, where the 
project failed utterly; and New York, with a limited degree of success.384
The United States codification movement found grounding to its activities thanks 
to two main sources of inspiration: Jeremy Bentham, with his utilitarian theory; and the 
French Code. 385 The second was a useful mold that seemed to apply to the United States 
conditions, and provided to the codifiers a code system that seemed to function correctly 
and with good results.386
                                                 
384 CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL 
REFORM  121 (1981). 
385 Id. supra note 384, at 74.  
386 Id. supra note 384, at 71.  
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In addition, the numerous Roman codes, especially the Code of Justinian, were 
well known and frequently referred to when drafting the projects in North America. Other 
significant contributions were the Digest and the 1825 Code which provided examples of 
the possibility of codifying inside the United States territory. Even when the above-
mentioned examples were not completely compatible to the common law system states, 
they provided a methodology of reform from which to learn.387
David Dudley Field deserves a special paragraph in this section. His avocation 
during the period 1830-1860 gave him a paramount position amongst the codifiers in the 
United States. Field was the fountainhead of the codification efforts in North America 
and his drafting for the State of New York were very important at that time. In addition, it 
has been said that his disciples continued with his particular stamp.388
 
3. Europe  
 
 It has been said that the influence of art.1928 was not limited to La., and that it 
was able to cross the Atlantic Ocean and grow in the old continent. An argentine legal 
historian, Nestor Pizarro, tries to describe the originality the 1825 Code had for the 
European community with respect to non-pecuniary damages. 389
 
a. A Particular Case (Germany) 
  
                                                 
387 Id. supra note 384, at 74.  
388 Id. supra note 384, at 187.  
389 Vide the work of NESTOR PIZARRO, EL CODIGO CIVIL ARGENTINO Y EL CODIGO DE LUISIANA (1950). 
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In 1857, Rudolf Jhering founded a periodical in Germany that was focus to study 
the potentiality of Roman law as to deal with modern problems. As he said in his first 
issue, the idea was to evolve through Roman law, beyond Roman law. 390
Later, in 1880, Jhering submitted for publication the well known paper about the 
interest of contracts and the presumed need for a pecuniary value of the mandatory 
obligations. 391 Allegedly, he had been able to find grounding in some texts of the roman 
digest, and there from built a theory by contractual liability that could exist even when no 
contract existed,392 i.e. culpa in contrahendo. 
The theory of culpa in contrahendo had two lines: i) liability for fault when 
contracting, and ii) classification of damages into positive and negative. The framers of 
the German Civil Code or Burgerliches Gesetzbuch fur das Deutsche Reich (BGB) were 
influenced by that theory and developed it into a general prong of pre-contractual liability 
categorized under strict contractual fault. Notwithstanding, those elements used the tort 
measure of damages as a standard when compensating and required reliance from the 
innocent party.393
It is important to understand that, before the enactment of the BGB, i.e. late 
Nineteenth century, the German civil law was strictly and rigidly construed by courts. 
Jhering argued against that rigidity, and advocated for an understanding of the law 
contemplating the involved interests. i.e. laws should protect the interests of individuals, 
and thus, justice and rights must be present in the legal system at the time of applying the 
                                                 
390 PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 122 (2003). 
391 Id. supra note 389, at 133. 
392 Id. supra note 390, at 122. 
393 Nadia E. Nedzel, A Comparative Study of Good Faith, Fair Dealing, and Precontractual Liability, 12 
Tul. Euro. &Civ. Rev. 112, 113 (1997). 
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law. The theory of Jhering intended to allow judges to interpret the German civil law, 
both with equity and ensuring the provisions of the BGB would not become outdated.394  
His contribution of the culpa in contrahendo had an outstanding success and 
turned out to be the main point for the evolution of numerous legislation endeavors. The 
ideas expressed in that paper of 1880, had been accepted expressly circa 50 years before 
by the 1825 Code. Not only by accepting the non-pecuniary damage but also by 
establishing that the amount of that reparation should be determined by a jury.395In other 
words, the 1825 Code considered the possibility of recovery for intellectual rights, moral 
motives, religious, and merely satisfactions that in that sense preceded for many years the 
conception of Jhering.396
It is hard to know and determine if Jhering, at the time of writing his paper, had 
access to a copy of the 1825 Code, however, he did not mention it.397 One of the 
objectives of this presentation is that other research activities continue with the task of 
defining the originality of the work of Jhering, and determine the influence the 1825 
Code could have provided.  
  
b. Other Areas of Europe 
 
A brief comment regarding non-pecuniary damages in Europe may be of interest 
for the readers. It could help to compare the application of non-pecuniary damages in 
                                                 
394 Id. supra note 394, at 122. 
395 Id. supra note 389, at 133.  
396 Id. supra note 389, at 144. 
397 Id. supra note 389, at 133. 
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other regions of the world, and it could develop an interest for future research activities 
that focus their work in the Old continent. 
It has been said that some, though not many, countries in Europe have statutes 
that expressly address the recovery of moral damages or non-pecuniary damages caused 
by the breach of a contract. 398  
Amongst those countries it is possible to mention the Switzerland. The Swiss 
Code of Obligations, of the year 1912, in its art.47 provides that the rules relative to the 
liability that arises from quasi-delicts are applicable by analogy to the consequences of 
contractual fault. 399 In addition, art.99 of the same code provides that a person who, 
through the fault of another, has suffered injury to an interest of a personal nature is 
entitled to claim, besides other damages, an additional sum of money as moral 
reparation, when that kind of reparation is justified by the particular seriousness of the 
moral damage suffered and also of the degree of the fault.400
An intermediate view has been adopted in the italic peninsula by the Italian Civil 
Code of the year 1942. This modern code continues with the style of the French Code, 
but has been strongly influenced by the form and content of the German BGB.401
Art.1174 of the Italian Civil Code speaks about the patrimonial nature of 
performance, and in one point says even not patrimonial.402 Hence, Italians have made a 
differentiation between the prestation and the perstation itself. The first, i.e. the interest 
                                                 
398 Id. supra note 129, at § 6.10  
399 Id. supra note 129, at § 6.10 
400 Id. supra note 129, at § 6.10. 
401 THE ITALIAN CIVIL CODE –TRANSALTED BY MARIO BELTRAMO ET AL. VII (1969) 
402 The complete text of art.1174 of the Italian Civil Code reads: The performance which is the object of an 
obligation must be of such nature as to be capable of economic evaluation and must correspond to an 
interest, even if not patrimonial, of the creditor,  according to Id. supra note 401, at 313. 
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the creditor has in the object of the obligation, does not have to be pecuniary. The second, 
i.e. the object of the obligation, has to have some financial relevance in order to allow the 
creditor to recover due to breach or non-fulfillment.403 Finally, it has been said that the 
Italian approach seems to find certain harmony with the provisions of the 1825 Code and 
the New Code.404
If the Swiss and Italian provisions found grounding in the BGB405, and knowing 
some jurists406 believe the BGB found inspiration in the 1825 Code, an intent to assert a 
link between the provisions of both continents, i.e. America (1825 Code) and Europe 
(BGB, later Italy and Switzerland), could be tried. 
As in the case of the United States, it could be valuable for further research 
activities to determine if the Italian and Swiss provisions on non-pecuniary damages had 
their origin or grounding in the 1825 Code.  
 
4. Latin America  
 
 The influence of the 1825 Code in Latin America was very important and it was 
certainly not limited to art.1928, therefore, several articles of the Latin American codes 
pull inspiration from the text of 1825 Code. 
 
                                                 
403 Saul Litvinoff, Obligations 1, 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 56 (1969). 
404 Id. supra note 129, at 56. 
405 The pertinent section of the BGB is 253, and it reads: For an injury which is not an injury to property 
compensation in Money may be demanded  only in the cases specified by law, according to THE GERMAN 
CIVIL CODE- TRANSLATED AND ANNOTATED BY CHUNG HUI WANG 57 (1907). 
406 Vide Id. supra note 389. 
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a. Covering the Whole Region  
 
Two main reasons can explain why the 1825 Code was a source of inspiration to 
all Latin American codifiers: i) Saint-Joseph and García Goyena were well known by the 
Latin American codifiers, and both jurists mentioned the 1825 Code in their works; and 
ii) the 1825 Code was the first civil code in America, and became a model for most new 
independent countries in Latin America407  
Regarding the first point, it should be said that Fortuné Anthoine de Saint-Joseph, 
an industrious man and judge at the court of first instance in Paris, finished by 1840 the 
monumental compilation work Concordance entre les Codes civils étrangers et le Code 
Napoléon.408 The Concordance helped to compared synoptically the French Code, 
printed in the left columns, to the most significant codifications at that time.409 The 
Concordance turned out to be a useful tool throughout the nineteenth century, by 
providing the codifiers in Latin America with a survey of and aid when codifying in civil 
law.410  
The other jurist that spread the existence of the 1825 Code was Florencio García 
Goyena. In 1851, this Spanish jurist and politician, presented a draft of his 
                                                 
407 Rolf Knutel, Influences of the Louisiana Civil Code in Latin America, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 1445, 1451 
(1996).  
408 Id. supra note 407, at 1449.  
409 The Concordance included the: Civil Code of the Kingdom of Two Sicilies; 1825 Code; Codice civile 
Albertino; Civil Code of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Burgerlijk Wetboek; Bavarian Civil Code, 
Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus Civilis; Austrian General Civil Code of 1811, Allgemeines Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch; and Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht of 1794. according to Id. supra note 407, at 1449  
410 Id. supra note 407, at 1450. 
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Concordancias, Motivos y Comentarios del Código Civil Español. García Goyena 
pointed out the 1825 Code in several articles of his work.411  
Both jurists were able to show the world the existence of the 1825 Code, an 
objective very difficult to achieve at that time regarding the precarious communication 
and publishing methods. 
 
b. Focusing in Argentina  
 
Argentina participated of the codification movement in Latin America during the 
mid-Nineteenth century. A particular interest for the readers may arise when studying the 
Argentine Civil Code of the year 1869 and its modification of the year 1968.  
The original text, drafted by Dalmacio Velez Sarsfield in the year 1869, mentions 
the 1825 Code as the source for 297 of its articles.412  From those 297 references, only 1 
mentions art.1928 of the 1825 Code as it source of inspiration. That sole reference can be 
found when reading the footnote413 to art.522414 of the Argentine Civil Code of 1869.  
Although the text of art.522 of the Argentine Civil Code of 1869 does not relate to 
non-pecuniary damages, i.e. does not refer to art.1928 (3), the mention of art.522 is 
                                                 
411 Id. supra note 407, at 1450. 
412 The author of this presentation has gone through all the articles of the Argentine code and arrived to that 
result. 
413 The footnote to art.522 of the Argentine Civil Code of 1869 reads: Code of Louisiana, article1928, says: 
“Nevertheless, if the obligation has been partially executed, the damages on which the parties have agreed, 
may be reduced to the loss or deprivation of the real gain,” according to Law No. 340, Sept. 25, 1869 
[1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 496. 
414 The argentine text reads in art.522: When upon the obligation it was agreed that if it was not fulfilled it 
would be paid a certain amount of money, neither a greater nor smaller amount can be given, according to 
Law No. 340, Sept. 25, 1869 [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 496. 
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significant because, with the Argentine revision of 1968, a curious coincidence took 
place.  
The revised text of art.522 of the Argentine Civil Code, drafted in 1968, provides 
that when an obligor fails to perform a contractual obligation the court may hold him 
liable, according to the nature of the failure and the circumstances of the case, for the 
moral damage sustained by the other party.415 Thus, non-pecuniary damages or daño 
moral may expressly be recovered in Argentina, according to the new wording of art.522.  
Ultimately, the 1825 Code was not only a link for La. with its French and Spanish 
past, but it is a living tie, today, with the legal systems of Latin America. As Professor 
Leonard Oppenheim stated: All of these countries also have civil codes based upon the 
Napoleonic Code. Thus, from the standpoint of legal scholarship, there is a decided line 
between La. and the Latin American countries, an important link in a chain which is 
steadily becoming stronger.416
 
                                                 
415 Free translation and interpretation by Id. supra note 129, at § 6.10. 
416 Charles L. Dufour, The Law in Louisiana, LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE WITH COMMENTS AND ANCILLARIES 
xi, xi (1989). 
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Summary and Final Considerations 
 
 
 Every research activity needs some final conclusions, in addition to those that 
have been already partially provided. Such conclusions will help the reader to achieve a 
complete understanding and to focus in the most important and significant contributions 
of the presentation. Having this in mind, it must be said that throughout the different 
Chapters of this presentation, the readers were able to gain knowledge in the topics that 
will be mentioned in the following paragraphs. 
Initially, the readers were able to understand the transition from the Spanish and 
French legal systems, into the La. legal system. That difficult transition stared in La. with 
the enactment of the Digest; and was followed by the Project, the 1825 Code, and 1870 
Code. The New Code is the present civil law in La., and is being subject to the revisions 
that the La. State Law Institute keeps proposing. 
The presentation also dedicated a special section to the French Code. In that section, 
the French Code was described and the influence it had was briefly explained. 
Readers also were provided with some definitions of non-pecuniary damages. The 
difference between moral damages and non-pecuniary was also mentioned. That 
reference to definitions and differences surely helped the readers to prepare for the 
understanding of the court applications of non-pecuniary damages in La. 
Also, art.1928 of the 1825 Code was carefully analyzed. The originality and 
importance of the article was mentioned. References to the English and French versions 
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of the article were made, together with the problems that the deficient translations 
presented for court interpretation since its drafting. 
The period 1825-1870 was especially studied regarding the way the La. Supreme 
Court applied art.1928.Results from the research done, both on hardcopy and electronic 
databases, reflect that the La. Supreme Courts faced the need to decide on non-pecuniary 
damages very rarely. The art.1928 (3) is mentioned in 21 cases during the period of time 
under study. From all those cases, only 5 refer exclusively to recovery of non-pecuniary 
damages under art.1928 (3), the remaining 16 cases refer to the jury discretion as to 
determine the amount to be recovered for damages. Therefore, it could be said that the 
arguments between the different interpretations of the art.1928 (3) that were mentioned 
when analyzing the French and English versions, started after the year 1870. That is, 
when the text was adopted only in English, and when the courts started to receive more 
claims. Ultimately, before the year 1870, it cannot be said that recovery of non-pecuniary 
damages had an important presence in La. In addition, some French court decisions 
related to non-pecuniary damages, dated in the same period under study, were mentioned.  
Another important part of this presentation was the reference to the potential 
influences that art.1928 had in other codification works. The first influences, inside La., 
were mentioned with respect to the 1870 Code and the New Code. The second potential 
influences, outside La., were: the work of Jhering in Germany and the BGB, the Italian 
and Swiss codification, the codification works in Latin America and specially Argentina. 
In brief, the work tried to detect the potential influence art.1928 had in La. and in other 
regions of the world.  
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 The development of the text of art.1928 into the text of art.1998 shows that the 
New Code includes many provisions having a basis in common law and Civil law, and 
that as it has been said before, La. has developed a legal system of its own, that could be 
classified as sui generis.417
Ultimately, it is important to mention that this presentation has neither the 
pretension of teaching, nor the design of imposing a work; it only wishes to be useful418 
for readers that are interested in the area of non-pecuniary damages. It also pursues to 
help future researchers when continuing with the activity of analyzing the legal history of 
the La. legal institutions.  
  
 
                                                 
417 Id. supra note 44, at 7-20. 
418 L. EYMA, STUDIES ON THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA vi (1840). 
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